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Introduction 
 
 
U.S policymakers increasingly focus their attention on the challenge of health 
care quality.  The intersection of health care quality and public policy is not new, but 
the desire to find more effective and prospective interventions against substandard care 
is much more pronounced than a generation ago.  For centuries, the legal system has 
employed a measurement system known as the “professional standard of care” to 
determine legal liability for medical negligence and this standard has become more 
rigorous over the past several decades.1  Furthermore, tools such as professional 
education and training, as well as licensure and accreditation, are longstanding in U.S. 
policy.   
 
But the rapid escalation in health costs that began in the early 1970s, 
accompanied by documented and inexplicable variations in health care quality as well 
as a movement toward greater openness in the relationship between patients and 
physicians, has led researchers into an increasingly critical examination of health care 
quality and toward the development of evidence-based measures for assessing quality.2  
These measures, which are then used to examine distinct sub-populations, payer 
systems, and diagnostic conditions, extend beyond an intellectual interest in health care 
quality.  Payers have exhibited a marked interest in using these population-based 
measures to gauge the value and quality of the services they purchase.3  This interest in 
turn has spurred quality improvement activities sponsored by the managed care 
industry, national accreditation organizations, and professional societies.4  Reporting 
systems now permit health care consumers to compare health systems on a variety of 
measures and indicators,5 and a number of studies and reports focus specifically on the 
quality of pediatric care.6  
                                       
1 Rosenbaum, S. (March 26, 2003). The Impact of United States Law on Medicine As a Profession. JAMA 
289(12),  http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/289/12/1546.pdf. 
2  See Adams, K. and Corrigan, JM., Eds. (2003).  Committee on Identifying Priority Areas for Quality 
Improvement,  Priority Areas for National Action: Transforming Health Care Quality. Washington, DC: 
National Academy Press; Institute of Medicine (1999).  To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System. 
Washington, DC:  IOM, http://www.iom.edu/includes/dbfile.asp?id=4117; Institute of Medicine (2000). 
Crossing the Quality Chasm: A New Health System for the 21st Century. Washington, DC:  IOM, 
http://www.iom.edu/includes/dbfile.asp?id=4124. 
3 See Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, http://www.cms.gov;  For a collection of materials and 
tools on purchasing quality health care, see http://www.facct.org/facct/site; for a sample of Leapfrog’s 
performance expectations, see http://www.leapfroggroup.org/toolkit/GMPatientSafetyPerf.pdf; See also 
Partridge, L. (2001).  The APHSA Medicaid HEDIS Database Project: Report for the Third Project Year (Data 
for 1999), Washington, DC: The Commonwealth Fund, December, 
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/quality/partridge_aphsa_hedis_1999.pdf (or Partridge, L. and Ingalls 
Szlyuk, C. (February, 2000). National Medicaid HEDIS Database/Benchmark Project.  Washington, DC: 
The Commonwealth Fund, http://www.cmwf.org/programs/quality/partridge_hedis_366.asp. 
4 For information about NCQA’s Quality Compass, see 
http://www.ncqa.org/Info/QualityCompass/index.htm; 
For information about JCAHO’s program in Performance Measurement in Health Care, see 
http://www.jcaho.org/pms/index.htm; See also, Leatherman, S. and McCarthy, D. (April, 2002).  Quality 
of Health Care in the United States: A Chartbook.  Washington, DC: The Commonwealth Fund, 
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/pub_highlight.asp?id=736&pubid=520&CategoryID=3. 
5 See NCQA’s Health Choices at http://www.healthchoices.org/. 
6 March, A. (April, 2003).  The Business Case for Clinical Pathways and Outcomes Management: A Case 
Study of Children’s Hospital and Health Center of San Diego. Washington, DC: The Commonwealth Fund, 
http://www.cmwf.org/programs/quality/march_physicianorderentry_609.pdf; Bethell, C. et al.  
(September, 2002) Partnering with Parents to Promote the Healthy Development of Young Children 
   2 
  
 
 
Quality improvement activities extend beyond the realm of informal activities by 
purchasers and health systems. Error reduction legislation designed to prospectively 
improve performance while shielding the medical care industry against excessive liability 
for negligence, has been enacted at the state level of government.7  Purchasers also 
have sought legally enforceable contractual approaches to quality that permit a level of 
legal accountability for health care quality that simply did not exist outside of the tort 
system a generation ago.  
 
This study, undertaken for the David and Lucile Packard Foundation, examines 
the structure and operation of Medicaid and State Children’s Health Insurance Program 
(SCHIP) health care access and quality monitoring systems for children enrolled in 
comprehensive managed care arrangements.  As the single largest purchasers of 
pediatric health care in the U.S., Medicaid and SCHIP agencies play a potentially 
powerful role in pediatric health policy.  How these agencies approach, design, and 
carry out health quality monitoring activities has the potential to have a major impact 
not only for poor and low-income children, but for the entire pediatric health system.  
Even when these systems are developed exclusively for publicly insured children, their 
influence can extend beyond the “four corners” of a specific contractual arrangement, 
since participating health professionals, health care institutions and businesses typically 
are not exclusive to these arrangements, and the devolutionary influence of one 
purchaser’s  expectations thus can travel beyond the scope of the agreement.  
 
This analysis opens with an overview of enforcement of health care access and 
quality standards at both the individual and purchaser level, providing both a brief 
overview of the safeguards and protections available to individual children and families, 
as well as applicable federal standards concerning agency enforcement action.   It then 
turns to the question of structure: what types of tools do public agencies maintain to 
assess—and more importantly enforce—expectations of health care quality?  Finally, it 
reports on the experiences of state agencies with the enforcement of standards.  The 
study concludes with a discussion of relevant policy implications. 
 
 
The Medicaid and SCHIP Health Quality Enforcement Framework:  
A Multi-Based Rationale for Focusing on Pediatric Health Quality 
 
 
For a number of reasons, the quality of care for low-income children insured 
through public insurance programs is of particular concern.  First, lower-income 
                                                                                                                           
Enrolled in Medicaid. Washington, DC: The Commonwealth Fund,  
http://www.cmwf.org/publist/publist2.asp?CategoryID=2. 
7 Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act (Reported in House)[H.R.663.RH]; Flowers, L. (February, 
2002).  State Responses to the Problem of Medical Errors: An Analysis of Recent State Legislative Proposals. 
Washington, DC: National Academy for State Health Policy, 
http://www.nashp.org/_docdisp_page.cfm?LID=05607042-4CAC-11D6-BCEE00A0CC558925; Rosenthal, J. 
and Booth, M. (March, 2003).  Defining Reportable Adverse Events:  A Guide for States Tracking Medical 
Error. Washington, DC: National Academy for State Health Policy. 
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children are at elevated risk for a wide range of physical, developmental, and mental 
health conditions and disorders.  This is true even in the case of children who enter 
public insurance through eligibility pathways other than disability (i.e., children whose 
connection to Medicaid and SCHIP is based on income alone).8  As Figure 1 shows, 
conditions requiring additional monitoring and preventive interventions are generally 
prevalent among lower income children. 
 
Figure 1.  Four States’ Top Ten Diagnoses of Chronic or Disabling Conditions 
among Child Medicaid Beneficiaries 
 
Diagnosis 
 
Number of states (of 4) in which 
this Condition is a “Top Ten” 
Diagnosis for Child Medicaid 
beneficiaries 
Asthma 4 
Attention Deficit Disorder 4 
Congenital Anomalies (e.g., cleft palate, Downs 
Syndrome) 
4 
Chronic Depression 4 
Intestinal Infectious Diseases (e.g., giardia) 4 
Osteopathies, Chondropathies, and Acquired 
Musculoskeletal Deformities (e.g., acquired 
deformities of limbs, osteomyelitis) 
4 
Burns 4 
Other Disorders of the Central Nervous System 
(e.g., multiple sclerosis, epilepsy) 
4 
Psychoses (e.g., schizophrenia, affective 
psychosis) 
2 
Neurotic Disorders (e.g., obsessive-compulsive 
disorders, agoraphobia) 
2 
Other Diseases of the Respiratory System (e.g., 
tracheostomy complication, abscess of lung) 
1 
Hernia of Abdominal Cavity 1 
 
Source: Brodsky et al., 20039 
 
A second reason for focusing on pediatric health policy relates to both the 
dominance of children in public insurance and the intermittent nature of their coverage, 
which triggers a need to maximize health quality during periods of coverage.  Children 
comprise some 50 percent of all Medicaid beneficiaries and nearly all SCHIP enrollees.  
The quality of pediatric care thus would be expected to be a dominant theme in health 
quality measurement.  Children’s eligibility patterns further propel the need for 
monitoring the quality of pediatric care.  Studies suggest that periods of Medicaid and 
SCHIP eligibility for a significant portion of enrollees may be, on average, no longer 
than 11 to 12 months, and children enrolled in Medicaid and SCHIP incur long periods 
                                       
8 Brodsky, K.L., Cuccia, L., Kelleher, A. et al (Eds) (March, 2003). The Faces of Medicaid: The Complexities 
of Caring for People with Chronic Illnesses and Disabilities. Washington DC:  The Center for Health Care 
Strategies, http://www.chcs.org/publications/cfm-view.html. 
9 Ibid. 
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without any coverage.10  The intermittent nature of children’s insurance coverage 
promotes a sense that health care should be optimized during periods of enrollment.11   
To that end, the managed care arrangements in which Medicaid and SCHIP agencies 
enroll most children may offer especially important protections, since the obligation of 
managed care contractors is not merely to cover necessary services that fall within the 
contract but to actually make care available.12  
 
A third rationale for the high interest in pediatric health quality is that the actual 
receipt of care, not mere coverage, is a distinct goal of U.S. pediatric health policy.  
Health promotion, along with early intervention to avert disability, represent major 
objectives of both Medicaid (as embodied in its special benefit known as “Early and 
Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment” services (EPSDT)13 and SCHIP.14  
Furthermore, the concern over health quality extends beyond the programmatic 
boundaries of Medicaid and SCHIP themselves.  Other important children’s programs 
such as HeadStart, the Supplemental Feeding Program for Women, Infants and Children 
(WIC), child welfare programs, and basic and special education programs all depend to 
at least some degree on access to health care among low-income children as part of 
their ability to achieve their own objectives.  For example, assuring access to preventive 
health services is a basic function of HeadStart programs; similarly, inclusion of 
necessary medical care is a specific aspect of the individualized education plans written 
for children who participate in the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).  
Yet neither HeadStart nor the IDEA maintains health funds of its own; each depends 
instead on Medicaid and SCHIP to finance health care.  Indeed, the IDEA specifically 
references Medicaid.  Medicaid, in turn, contains statutory references to the IDEA, WIC, 
and other programs serving children. 
 
Finally, health quality has evolved as a focus of large health insurance 
purchasers in conjunction with the evolution of the entire insurance system.  Twenty 
years ago, Medicaid agencies, like private insurers, paid bills as Medicaid participating 
providers interacted with their patients.  Undeniably, Medicaid agencies historically have 
had a statutory obligation to focus on pediatric access under EPSDT, as well as a duty 
to focus on provider selection and health quality.15  But fundamentally, Medicaid 
                                       
10 Dick, A., Allison, A., Haber, S. et al. (Spring 2002)Consequences of States’ Policies for SCHIP 
Disenrollment.  Health Care Financing Review 23(3): 65-88; Allison, A., Andrew, A., Shenkman, E. (June 
27, 2003) Pathways Through SCHIP: A Longitudinal Analysis of Enrollment and Coverage Patterns. 
Presentation at 20th Annual Research Meeting of AcademyHealth, Nashville, TN; Austein Casnoff, C. (June 
26, 2003) The State Children’s Health Insurance Program (SCHIP)— 
 
Five Years of Progress.  Presentation at Fifth Annual Child Health Services Research Meeting: What Works 
in Child Health Services Research, Nashville, TN. 
11 Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured (Mary 31, 2002). Children’s Health—Why Health 
Insurance Matters.  Fact Sheet, Washington, DC: KFF, http://www.kff.org/content/2002/4055/4055.pdf. 
12 Rosenbaum, S. (February 19, 2003). Managed Care and Patients Rights (Editorial)  Journal of the 
American Medical Association 289 (7): 906-907, http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/full/289/7/906. 
13 Rosenbaum, S. and Sonosky, C. (December, 2000) Federal EPSDT Coverage Policy: An Analysis of State 
Medicaid Plans and State Medicaid Managed Care Contracts.  
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/medicaid_publications_epsdt.htm 
14 Rosenbaum, S., and Sonosky, C. (2001) Medicaid Reforms and SCHIP: Health Care Coverage and the 
Changing Policy Environment in DeVita, C., and Mosher-Williams, R., Eds. Who Speaks for America’s 
Children: The Role of Child Advocates in Public Policy. Washington, DC: The Urban Institute. 
15 §1902(a)(8) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(8); §1902(a)(30)(A) of the Social Security 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(30)(A); §1902(a)(43) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396a(a)(43);  42 
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agencies functioned similarly to private indemnity arrangements in their relatively distant 
relationship with actual provider performance.  Provider participation contracts 
contained no performance measures or treatment duties but instead were limited to the 
business elements of the relationship (e.g., payment terms, licensure and accreditation 
status, and term and termination).  Today Medicaid and SCHIP agencies, like private 
purchasers, purchase “hybrid” health coverage arrangements that specifically and 
contractually merge coverage and care. As the United States Supreme Court has 
observed, these arrangements “wear two hats” and obligate contractors not only to the 
management of insurance resources but also to the management of health care itself.16  
This fundamental  shift in the nature of insurance coverage compels purchasers to 
extend their focus beyond simple claims payment and into the realm of access and 
quality.  Figure 2 shows the numerous “domains” covered by these contracts; 17 together, 
these domains reflect the underlying dimensions of classic quality assessment: structure, 
process of care, health care outcomes, and consumer interaction with the health system. 
 
  Figure 2.  Managed Care Contracting Domains 
 
 
Key Domains 
 
Enrollment 
Coverage and Benefits 
Service Duties 
Public Health and Social Service Agency 
Relationships 
Quality Assurance, Data, and Reporting 
Business Terms and Relationships 
Payment 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System, www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
 
                                                                                                                           
C.F.R. §441.56; §1915(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396n(b); §1932(b)(5) and §1932(c) of the 
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §1396u-2(b)(5) and (c);  §42 C.F.R. 431.55   
16 Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211.  
17 See Rosenbaum, S. et al., Negotiating the New Health System:  A Nationwide Study of Medicaid 
Managed Care Contracts, 1st-4th editions (1997-2001), Washington, DC:  GWU-CHSRP, 
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm. 
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Part I: Pathways to Accountability 
 
 
A. Individual Enforcement of Health Care Access and Quality Standards 
 
 
In some cases, federal and state laws offer children and their families means for 
enforcing the legal obligations undertaken by managed care contractors on their behalf.   
But as important as they are, individual legal enforcement tools are quite constrained, 
inaccessible, and not particularly effective in structuring systemic improvements in 
quality.  These limitations grow out of the nature of law and legal enforcement, the 
difficulties in securing legal representation, and practical considerations in litigation. 
 
Table 1 sets out a taxonomy of individual legal enforcement mechanisms, as well 
as their application and limitations.  As Table 1 shows, in the context of this study, 
individual enforcement can be categorized into four major categories: a) health care 
quality litigation involving medical liability; b) litigation to enforce federal rights; c) 
litigation to enforce state law rights, particularly rights created by the large purchasing 
agreements; and d) grievances and appeals.  Each tool has distinct applications and 
limitations.  
 
Table 1. Individual Enforcement Mechanisms: Legal Basis, Application, and 
Limitations 
 
 
MECHANISM 
 
 
LEGAL BASIS 
 
APPLICATION 
 
LIMITATIONS 
a) Malpractice litigation State law (common 
law and statutory 
rights) 
Against individual 
health professionals 
 
Against health care 
corporations 
including managed 
care organizations for 
both corporate and 
vicarious liability 
Complex elements of 
proof 
 
Limited availability in 
the case of low-income 
children 
 
Available only after 
serious injury has 
occurred 
b) Enforcement of 
federal legal rights 
Federal statutes Can be used in those 
cases in which federal 
law is determined to 
create both 
enforceable 
individual 
expectations among 
persons served by a 
program and the legal 
right to bring an 
individual 
enforcement action   
The narrow nature of 
what courts will 
recognize as a “legal” 
right 
 
The imminence of the 
injury that must be 
present 
 
The complexity of 
systemic class-wide 
litigation and the 
difficulty of fashioning 
and monitoring 
workable legal remedies, 
particularly where the 
legal issues are access 
and quality 
c) Enforcement of State constitutions, Can be used to 3 states specifically 
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MECHANISM 
 
 
LEGAL BASIS 
 
APPLICATION 
 
LIMITATIONS 
contractual rights 
created by managed 
care state contracts  
statutes, and 
regulations; state 
“common law” 
enforce quality-
related rights that are 
created by contracts 
between state 
agencies and 
managed care 
organizations. 
 
preclude third party 
enforcement actions by 
Medicaid and SCHIP 
enrollees  
 
Injury must be actual or 
imminent 
 
Size and complexity of 
actions; suits typically 
limited to named 
individuals only; 
remedies  difficult to 
devise and monitor 
d) Grievances, appeals, 
and fair hearings 
Federal law, state 
contracts, state rules 
and statutes 
Individual cases 
where care has been 
or may be denied 
Single claims and non-
systemic in nature.   
 
Injuries must be actual or 
imminent 
 
Source: GW CHSRP, 2003. 
 
a. Medical malpractice litigation 
 
Medical malpractice cases can be brought not only against health professionals 
but against health care corporations,18 including litigation against managed care 
organizations for both vicarious19 and corporate20 liability.  But bringing malpractice 
actions is difficult, costly, and time consuming and the number of cases is very small in 
relation to the total number of possible negligence events.21  Poor children may be at 
particular risk of under-representation, because of financial disincentives in their 
representation.  Unless there exists the type of negligent conduct that would be 
considered egregious under state law and thus would qualify for noneconomic 
damages (e.g., willful or wanton disregard for human life), pediatric cases are worth little 
other than the families’ out-of-pocket medical care costs because in the case of 
children, lost earnings would not be an issue.    
 
b. Federal rights enforcement 
 
Medicaid (and SCHIP when it is administered as part of the Medicaid plan) 
creates certain federal legal rights in children. Federal law establishes certain legal rights 
to coverage and benefits, and children have the right to seek recourse in court when 
these rights are allegedly violated.22  But these rights are narrow; indeed, many of the 
                                       
18 Rosenblatt, R.., Rosenbaum, S., and Frankford, D. (1997, 2002-2002 Supp) Law and the American 
Health Care System, Chapter 3, New York, NY:  Foundation Press.  
19 Boyd v. Albert Einstein Medical Center, 547 A2nd 1229 (Pa. Super 1988);  Shannon v. McNulty 718 A2nd 
828 (Pa. Super. 1988); and Petrovitch v. Share Health Plan 719 NE 2nd 756. 
20 Moscovitch v. Danbury Hospital  25 F. Supp 2d 74 (D.Ct. 1998); In re US Healthcare; Lazorka v. Penn 
Hospital 237 F3d 242 (3rd Circuit, 2000). 
21 See, e.g., Roan Gresenz, C., Hensler, D, Studdert, D. et al. (1999) A Flood of Litigation? Predicting the 
Consequences of Changing Legal Remedies Available to ERISA Beneficiaries. Health RAND Law Issue 
Paper, http://www.rand.org/publications/IP/IP184/ 
22 42 U.S.C. §1983. 
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most important general legal duties of states and their contractors under managed care 
may not create individually enforceable rights at all but may instead be capable of 
enforcement only by the Secretary of Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  
 
c. Third party beneficiary enforcement 
 
Traditionally, state courts have recognized a “common law” (i.e., judicially 
created) right on the part of insured persons to enforce the terms of their contracts.23  
This right is known as “third party beneficiary enforcement,” and is embodied for the 
most part in modern state insurance laws, as well as federal laws related to insurance 
and health plans.   
 
Third party enforcement does not appear to apply to Medicaid and SCHIP, 
however. Evidence from other studies suggests that these contracts may be exempt from 
state insurance laws either entirely or in part with a separate and legally distinct body of 
regulation.24  Our own review of state Medicaid and SCHIP contracts suggests 
considerable ambiguity regarding the application of state insurance law.  Indeed, of the 
contracts we analyzed,25 only five contain provisions relating to third party beneficiary 
enforcement; of these, two (Minnesota and North Carolina) contain language expressly 
declaring that Medicaid beneficiaries are intended third party beneficiaries to the 
contract between the state and the managed care organization; the remaining three 
direct that beneficiaries are not to be considered third party beneficiaries.26  No similar 
provisions were found in the separate SCHIP managed care contracts.  
 
State Medicaid and SCHIP agencies could give beneficiaries the right to enforce 
at least certain contractual terms directly through third party beneficiary actions but few 
do so.  Although a state agency has the legal power to broadly define a range of 
contractual injuries that are capable of legal enforcement by enrollees, practical and 
market considerations obviously preclude this.  What company would be willing to do 
business with a state agency that made it easy for enrollees to sue the contractor for 
general complaints about health care quality? 
 
With respect to all forms of judicial remedies, it is important to note that the very 
power of both state and federal courts causes them (and legislatures) to be strict about 
who can gain access to judicial relief and under what circumstances.  To the layperson, 
it may appear that there is a deluge of cases.  But in fact, very few claims of legal injury 
are ever litigated in court because of strict jurisprudential rules related to who can bring 
cases and under what circumstances, as well as numerous federal and state laws that 
not only make the process of litigation difficult but also curb the size of recoveries.27  
                                       
23 See Calamari and Perillo, Contracts 3rd Ed. 1987, §§17-4, 17-7.   
24 See, e.g., Kaye, N. (June 2001) Medicaid Managed Care: A Guide for States, 5th Edition Portland, ME: 
National Academy of State Health Policy; Perkins, J, Hitov, S. (September 2003) Enforcing the Bargain: 
An Overview of Third Party Beneficiary Claims in Medicaid Cases. 
http://www.healthlaw.org/pubs/200310.issuebrief.htm 
25 A total of 50 Medicaid managed care contracts and 15 separate SCHIP contracts were reviewed. 
26 No contract included a third party beneficiary provision in specifications concerning an enrollee’s 
rights and responsibilities.  Rhode Island is the only state that defines the term  “party,” making clear that 
the state and the MCO are the only contracting parties to the contractual agreement.  Negotiating the New 
Health System, 2001. 
27 Moscovitch v. Danbury Hospital  25 F. Supp 2d 74 (D.Ct. 1998); In re US Healthcare; Lazorka v. Penn 
Hospital 237 F3d 242 (3rd Circuit, 2000). 
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Most fundamentally perhaps, courts insist on real individual injury before they intervene 
(known as the law of “standing”), as opposed to generalized complaints about how a 
system is working.  This means that even if a remedy is available, a legal representative 
can be found, and the process is accessible, children cannot use their individual 
enforcement tools unless they have been injured or face an imminent risk of injury.    
 
d. Individual enforcement through administrative complaints 
 
Federal law accords Medicaid and SCHIP enrolled children the right to appeal 
managed care denials and delays in coverage and care and guarantees the right to an 
external and impartial review of claims.  Figure 3 summarizes the key elements of 
federal law related to Medicaid and SCHIP external grievances and appeals.   But a 
grievance and appeal also involves injuries that either have occurred or that are 
imminent.  Furthermore, appeals are by their nature individualized, non-precedential, 
and thus not a means of making systemic change.  Studies of grievance and appeals 
systems suggest that they are seldom used in relation to the incidence of injury.28  Thus, 
as important as the legal right to appeal and external review may be, it is not a substitute 
for systemic monitoring and enforcement. 
 
Figure 3.  Key Elements of Medicaid and SCHIP External Grievances and Appeals 
 
 
KEY ELEMENTS 
 
MEDICAID 
 
 
SCHIP 
 
General 
requirement 
• States must provide for an 
opportunity for a “fair hearing” 
process when benefits are denied 
and follow specific time frames for 
hearing decisions.  They may allow 
enrollees direct access to a fair 
hearing (i.e., enrollees do not need 
to exhaust an MCO’s internal 
grievances and appeals system 
before they appeal to the state).  
They must ensure that their hearing 
system meets the minimum, 
federally-specified requirements 
(see below). 
 
 
 
• States must provide an opportunity 
for an independent, external review 
process when benefits are denied 
and set specific time frames for the 
review.  They have flexibility in how 
they design the process: they can 
either meet the minimum 
requirements set in federal 
regulations (see below) or, if a state’s 
consumer protection law meets or 
exceeds these requirements, they can 
rely on state law and choose to 
require providers to comply with 
state-specific grievance and appeals 
requirements currently in effect for 
health insurers in the state.  States 
may elect to use the Medicaid “fair 
hearing” process. 
Core elements of 
the process 
• The hearing system must allow for 
either a hearing before the state 
agency or an evidentiary hearing at 
the local level with a right to 
appeal to the state level.  The 
hearing system must follow due 
• Reviews must be conducted by an 
impartial person or entity, review 
decisions must be timely and 
written, and enrollees must have an 
opportunity to represent themselves 
or use a representative of their 
                                       
28 See, e.g., Pollitz, K., Crowley, J., Lucia, K., Bangit, E. (May 2002) Assessing State External Review 
Programs 
and the Effects of Pending Federal Patients' Rights Legislation, Washington, DC: Kaiser Family 
Foundation, http://www.kff.org/content/2002/3221/externalreviewpart2rev.pdf; Studdert, D., Roan 
Gresenz, C. (February 19, 2003) Enrollee Appeals of Preservice Coverage Denials at 2 Health Maintenance 
Organizations Journal of the American Medical Association 289 (7): 864-870, http://jama.ama-
assn.org/cgi/content/full/289/7/864 
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KEY ELEMENTS 
 
MEDICAID 
 
 
SCHIP 
 
process standards.  Hearings must 
be conducted by an impartial 
individual.  Decisions must be 
timely and written.  Enrollees must 
have an opportunity to represent 
themselves or use a representative 
of their choice, review their files 
and other relevant information, 
fully participate in the hearing 
process, and receive continued 
enrollment. 
choice, review their files and other 
relevant information, fully participate 
in the review process, and receive 
continued enrollment. 
Matters subject to 
review 
• Eligibility or enrollment, both 
initial and subsequent decisions 
regarding eligibility. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Health services, including changes 
in the type or amount of services. 
 
 
 
 
 
• Eligibility or enrollment, including 
denial of eligibility, failure to make a 
timely eligibility determination and 
suspension or termination of 
enrollment, including disenrollment 
for failure to pay cost-sharing 
contributions. 
• Health services, including delay, 
denial, reduction, suspension or 
termination of health services, 
including the determination about 
the type or level of services, and 
failure to approve, furnish or provide 
payment for health services in a 
timely manner. 
Impartial review • Hearings must be conducted by 
one or more impartial officials or 
other individuals not directly 
involved in the matter under 
review. 
• Independent, external review must 
be conducted by the state or a 
contractor other than the contractor 
responsible for the health services 
matter subject to external review. 
Time frames • Final administrative actions must be 
taken within 90 days from the date 
the enrollee filed an appeal or from 
the date an enrollee filed for direct 
access to a state fair hearing, if the 
state permits direct access.  
Expedited timeframes, applicable 
when the enrollee’s health 
condition requires, consist of 3 
working days from the time the 
agency receives the case file from 
the MCO or from the time the 
agency receives a request directly 
from an MCO enrollee. 
• Reviews must be completed in 
accordance with the medical needs 
of the patient.  A standard timeframe 
(applicable when medical needs do 
not dictate a shorter time frame) 
consists of 90 calendar days from the 
date an enrollee requests an internal 
or external review.  An expedited 
timeframe (applicable when medical 
needs dictate a shorter time frame) 
consists of 72 hours from the time an 
enrollee requests an external review 
and can be extended to 14 calendar 
days at the request of the enrollee. 
Continuation of 
enrollment 
• Coverage continues during an 
appeal that is requested in a timely 
manner. 
• Coverage continues until the review 
of a suspension or termination of 
enrollment, including a decision to 
disenroll for failure to pay cost-
sharing, is completed. 
Notice • States must give at least 10 days 
advance written notice of their 
intention to terminate, suspend or 
reduce eligibility or covered 
services, provide the reasons for the 
action, and inform enrollees of 
their appeal rights.  
 
• States must provide timely written 
notice of any determination subject 
to review, which includes: reasons 
for the determination; an 
explanation of applicable rights to 
review that determination; the 
standard and expedited times frames 
for review; the manner in which a 
review can be requested; and the 
circumstances under which 
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KEY ELEMENTS 
 
MEDICAID 
 
 
SCHIP 
 
enrollment may continue pending 
review. 
 
Source: GW CHSRP, 2003. 
B. State Agency Obligations to Monitor and Enforce Quality Standards 
 
 
Federal law requires Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to engage in various types of 
activities aimed at ensuring health care quality.  These obligations, summarized in Figure 
4 begin with the development of a contract itself and continue throughout a monitoring 
and enforcement phase.  
 
Figure 4.  Federal Medicaid and SCHIP Health Care Quality Requirements  
 
 
FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
MEDICAID 
 
 
SCHIP 
Development of contract States must use contracts for 
coverage or other services that 
comply with federal procurement 
requirements, which include: (1) 
states must provide for 
administrative, contractual, and 
legal remedies for breaches of 
the contract, including 
termination; (2) states must grant 
access to books, documents, 
papers, and records for audit and 
examination purposes; (3) states 
must monitor and report on 
program performance; (4) states 
must evaluate contractors’ 
performance and document 
whether they meet the terms, 
conditions, and specifications of 
the contract.  In addition, the 
contract must specify the 
following: (1) the population 
covered by the contract; (2) 
enrollment and reenrollment 
procedures; (3) amount, 
duration and scope of services; 
(4) evaluation of quality, 
appropriateness and timeliness 
of services delivered under the 
contract; (5) procedures and 
criteria for termination of the 
contract; (6) appropriate record 
system; (7) confidentiality 
protections; (8) third party 
liability activities; (9) 
subcontract requirements.  
States must use contracts for 
coverage or other services that 
comply with federal procurement 
requirements, which include: (1) 
states must provide for 
administrative, contractual, and 
legal remedies for breaches of 
the contract, including 
termination; (2) states must grant 
access to books, documents, 
papers, and records for audit and 
examination purposes; (3) states 
must monitor and report on 
program performance; (4) states 
must evaluate contractors’ 
performance and document 
whether they meet the terms, 
conditions, and specifications of 
the contract. 
Contractual standards States must include standards on 
access, structure and operations, 
and measurement and 
improvement in their contracts 
with MCOs. Access standards 
include: (1) availability of 
States must abide by the 
contractual standards described 
above. 
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FEDERAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
MEDICAID 
 
 
SCHIP 
services by providing access to 
an adequate provider network, 
timely access to services, and 
culturally competent services; (2) 
coordinated care and continuity 
of care; (3)  coverage and 
authorization of services.  
Structure and operation 
standards include: (1) provider 
selection; (2) enrollee 
information; (3) confidentiality; 
(4) enrollment and 
disenrollment; (5) internal 
grievance systems; (6) 
subcontracts.  Measurement and 
improvement standards include: 
(1) practice guidelines; (2) 
quality assessment and 
performance improvement 
program.  Performance measures 
and improvement projects are 
not defined, but can be federally 
determined; states are not 
required to establish minimum 
performance levels; and 
evaluations can be plan-
conducted or state-conducted or 
both. 
Agency’s monitoring and 
enforcement of contract and 
contractual standards 
States must implement a quality 
assessment and performance 
improvement program, which 
they must use to monitor and 
evaluate compliance with, at a 
minimum, standards of access to 
care, structure and operations, 
and quality measurement and 
improvement.  The program must 
include an annual, external 
independent review of quality 
outcomes, timeliness of services, 
and access to care.  It must also 
provide for intermediate 
sanctions. 
States must ensure quality and 
appropriateness of care.  They 
also must establish and 
implement procedures to 
investigate and resolve cases of 
fraud and abuse. 
 
Source: GW CHSRP, 2003. 
 
In virtually all states, children, including those who are publicly insured, have 
basic legal rights to sue for injuries caused by medical negligence.29  
 
Children enrolled in managed care arrangements do have certain grievance and 
appeals rights in the event that care is denied or delayed.  These appeals systems offer 
some opportunity for external oversight of health plan conduct, but as with other 
individual legal tools, the grievance and appeals system tends to operate at a late stage 
in the health system, when allegedly necessary care already has been delayed or 
denied.  Although federal law provides protections to ensure rapid reviews in certain 
emergency situations, the potential for injury must be imminent in order to invoke a 
                                       
29 Rosenblatt et al., op.cit. 
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fast-track response.  Furthermore, it is unclear what impact disparate individual legal 
actions have on large systemic quality challenges.  An isolated case can take on 
enormous significance when the negligence is clear, the case is publicized, and the 
award is enormous, but these types of cases are rare.  A good quality management 
system would consider patterns of complaints and grievances when examining overall 
operations but pronounced patterns would be important in such cases.30  
 
In sum, the role of purchasers in fostering the quality of care is key, given the 
lack of active federal oversight or individual legal remedies that are effective at the 
systemic level.  This study examines efforts by state Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to 
use their power as the largest purchasers of pediatric health care in the nation to ensure 
pediatric health care quality in comprehensive managed care settings.  In 2002, 
approximately 36 percent of all children were covered by the two programs,31 making 
them the most significant purchasers of pediatric care, with the theoretical ability to 
influence overall system quality through their expectations and their active enforcement 
of these expectations through quality measurement.  Medicaid and SCHIP interventions 
are particularly important in the case of comprehensive managed care because of the 
nature of the managed care systems in which children are enrolled.  Because of the 
budgetary constraints under which they operate and within which their families live, 
Medicaid and SCHIP agencies contract for tightly managed arrangements that permit 
only the most limited out-of-network coverage and employ strict forms of utilization 
management.  The consequences of tight management relative to a population with 
elevated health risks can be seen in the broad and detailed contracts that Medicaid and 
SCHIP agencies write for their contractors.  In earlier studies, we have found that 
Medicaid managed care contracts are relatively comprehensive in the areas of health 
care access, network capacity and competence, and the general service duties of 
managed care organizations toward enrollees.32  The question thus becomes how these 
detailed expectations are measured and enforced.  
 
 
C. State Contracting Practices and their Enforcement  
 
 
As previously noted, contracts are a federal requirement when Medicaid and 
SCHIP managed care arrangements are used.  This requirement of a written agreement 
with providers and subcontractors rests not only on the provisions of the two benefits 
laws but on general federal grants management rules related to the administration of 
federal programs.    
 
In keeping with the broad discretion granted states, the federal government does 
not design basic Medicaid and SCHIP managed care contracts for states to use.  As a 
result, each state develops its own basic agreements that incorporate both federal 
standards as well as its own specifications based on local conditions and priorities.  
These specifications also reflect state laws related to contracts with private companies, 
which can be quite extensive.    
                                       
30 See, e.g., the National Committee on Quality Assurance, www.ncqa.org 
31 www.kff.org 
32 See Rosenbaum, S. et al., Negotiating the New Health System:  A Nationwide Study of Medicaid 
Managed Care Contracts, 1st-4th editions (1997-2001), Washington, DC:  GWU-CHSRP, 
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm. 
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a. Summary of previous findings 
 
 
For nearly a decade, the Center for Health Services Research and Policy at The 
George Washington University has studied Medicaid and SCHIP managed care contracts 
and analyzed and reported on their contents.33  Findings, which have been widely 
disseminated over the years, can be summarized as follows:  First, in the case of 
children, the contracts are comprehensive and reflect not only the coverage standards 
of federal law but additional standards of performance that states expect.  Second, the 
contracts vary tremendously in what they emphasize and prioritize, although less so in 
the case of children, perhaps because the federal pediatric standards are themselves 
uniform and comprehensive.  For example, a state with a high incidence of childhood 
lead poisoning may amplify the lead screening provisions of the Medicaid EPSDT 
program and set forth very detailed expectations regarding when, how, and where the 
screen should occur, the protocols that should be used, and how the data should be 
reported.  Another state with a limited lead poisoning problem may barely mention lead 
screening beyond the minimum requirements.  
 
Third, in the case of Medicaid only (which is far broader than SCHIP in its 
coverage requirements) many states contract for less than all required benefits under 
federal law, leaving certain types of benefits and coverage either entirely or partially in 
the residual Medicaid program.  For example, some states may omit certain prescription 
drugs from their contracts, or specify levels of nursing home and home health benefits 
that are less than the full coverage available to beneficiaries under Medicaid amount, 
duration and scope standards.  
 
Fourth, in state Medicaid programs that use multiple “prime contractors” (e.g., a 
comprehensive managed care organization and a managed behavioral health 
organization), there may be coverage “pockets” or “gaps” between the contracts.  These 
                                       
33 Rosenbaum, S., et al. (1997-2001), Negotiating the New Health System: A Nationwide Study of Medicaid 
Managed Care Contracts, Editions 1-4, op cit.; Kamoie, B., Rosenbaum, S., Stange, P., (2003). 
Implementation and Management of Public Health Programs in a Managed-Care Legal Framework. Law in  
Public Health Practice (R. Goodman, et al., Eds) New York, NY: Oxford University Press; Rosenbaum, S., 
Skivington, S., Praeger, S. (2002). Public Health Emergencies and the Public Health/Managed Care 
Challenge. The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics, 30(3)(supp.): 63-69; Rosenbaum, S., Mauery, R., 
Blake, S., Wehr, E. (2000).  Public Health in a Changing Health Care System: Linkages Between Public 
Health Agencies and Managed Care Organizations in the Treatment and Prevention of Sexually 
Transmitted Diseases.  Washington, DC:  Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation; Rosenbaum, S. (1999).  
Approaches for Assuring Access to Quality Health Care Through State Contracts with Managed Care Plans.  
Access to Health Care, Washington, DC: Kaiser Commission on Medicaid and the Uninsured; Blake, S., 
Wehr, E. (1999). Asthma and Managed Care: A Focused Study of Asthma-Related Medicaid Managed Care 
Contract Provisions. Report to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Mauery, R., Rosenbaum, S., 
Woolley, Wehr, E., Sofaer, S. (1998). An Evaluation of Emerging Relationships Through Memoranda of 
Understanding Between Managed Care Organizations and Public Health Agencies: Implications for 
Population-Based Communicable Disease Prevention and Control Programs and Public Health Policy.  
Washington, DC:  GWU Center for Health Services Research and Policy; Rosenbaum, S., (1998). 
Negotiating the New Health System: Purchasing Publicly Accountable Managed Care. American Journal 
of Preventative Medicine, 14:3S; Blake, S., Rosenbaum, S., Wehr, E. (1997).  Contract Specifications for 
Sexually Transmitted Disease (STD) Services in Medicaid Managed Care Plans. A Focused Study.  Atlanta, 
GA: Centers for Disease Control and Prevention; Rosenbaum, S., Richards, T. (Summer 1996).  Medicaid 
Managed Care and Public Health Policy. Journal Public Health Management Practice 2(3): 76-82. 
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also can exist when a single comprehensive contract contains certain ambiguities and 
must be interpreted against the residual coverage under the state plan. These gaps – 
which tend to be an inevitable problem when the less-than-precise art of contract 
drafting meets the complexity of federal law – are of obvious importance to all parties to 
the agreement as well as those on whose behalf the agreement is written or who are 
paid through the agreement.  Ambiguities in drafting can lead to ambiguities regarding 
who is at financial risk for costly services. Contractors may be unclear as to where their 
service duties begin and end.  Providers may be unclear regarding who will pay them 
for their services, the state or a contractor.  Comprehensive and behavioral contractors 
may disagree over the point at which the former company’s mental health service duties 
end and the specialty system’s begin, with resulting dilemmas for providers in the two 
systems.  And finally of course, the beneficiaries of these agreements may confront a 
situation in which everyone – the state, the contractors, and the network providers – 
disavows responsibility to manage and pay for particular conditions.  This type of 
confusion may be most evident in the case of children with complex and co-occurring 
mental and physical conditions, whose management is challenging to begin with and 
whose families must navigate several distinct systems – their comprehensive health plan 
coverage, their behavioral health plan coverage in the case of states that use behavioral 
providers,34 and the state plan.  
 
Our previous analysis found that because coverage is narrower and predicated 
on a commercial insurance model, SCHIP programs tend to buy all services from single 
contractors, thereby removing this layer of complexity that is part of Medicaid managed 
care.35  However, the same problem of drafting ambiguities can still be decisively 
present.  Since state SCHIP agencies are at risk for coverage and payment of all services 
enumerated in their state plans (unless and until a service is removed) a state SCHIP 
agency and its contractors can find themselves in similar coverage disputes.  States and 
their contractors similarly can find themselves in disagreement over the meaning of non-
coverage provisions of SCHIP agreements, such as provisions related to access and 
quality. 
 
Because Medicaid and SCHIP contracts are comprehensive and because, as 
discussed in the previous section, the primary role in contracts and their enforcement is 
assigned to state agencies, it is important to understand both the powers that state 
agencies have to pursue contract enforcement as well as the process of enforcement 
itself.  The importance of state activities in this area is magnified by the limited 
enforcement capabilities that children have on their own, as well as by the outright 
prohibition against third party contract enforcement imposed by many states and by the 
limitations described above on individual enforcement inherent in the federal law of 
individual rights.  
 
                                       
34 See Rosenbaum, S., Mauery, D.R., Teitelbaum, J. (August 2001).  Issue Brief 14: An Overview of Legal 
Developments in Managed Care Caselaw and Selected Case Studies of Legal Developments in State 
Contracting for Managed Behavioral Health Services, Washington, DC:  GWU Center for Health Services 
Research and Policy, http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/behavioral_health/bhib-14.pdf. 
35 Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System, op.cit.; Rosenbaum, S., Shaw, K., Sonosky, C.  
(December 2001) Managed Care Purchasing under SCHIP: A Nationwide Analysis of Freestanding SCHIP 
Contracts SCHIP Policy Brief #3, Washington, DC: GWU Center for Health Services Research and Policy, 
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/SCHIP_brief3.pdf 
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b. Contract design and enforcement 
 
Drawing on a unique database maintained by the George Washington University 
Center for Health Services Research and Policy (CHSRP)36 , we reviewed the mechanisms 
for enforcing compliance with pediatric performance standards that are internal to the 
risk contracts between Medicaid and SCHIP purchasers and MCOs.  The analysis 
focused on contracts in effect as of March 31, 2000 in 16 states: Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, 
New York, Ohio, South Carolina, Texas, Washington, Wisconsin.  Twelve of these states 
are also the focus of the Urban Institute’s Assessing the New Federalism project.37  The 
remaining four are among the states that have communities being tracked by the Center 
for the Study of Health Systems Change.38  Together, these states represent 58 percent of 
all Medicaid beneficiaries and 53 percent of Medicaid beneficiaries enrolled in MCOs in 
2001. Similarly, they represent over 90 percent of the 3.25 million SCHIP beneficiaries 
enrolled in MCOS in 2001.39 This analysis focuses on remedies and enforcement 
involving comprehensive MCOs and does not examine enforcement against individual 
practitioners.  In addition, we focused on enforcement rather than incentivization in this 
review, since our goal was to determine the remedies that exist where a state concludes 
that perhaps in spite of incentivization,40 non-compliance is a problem that must be 
addressed.  
 
The analysis focused on contractual remedies, however states have other tools 
that can be used to enforce contract standards.  These include state licensure laws 
aimed at assuring that only health plans with certain capabilities are eligible to bid for 
state-financed managed care contracts, anti-fraud statutes aimed at both civil and 
criminal conduct, and other general laws relevant to consumer protection.  These laws 
are extremely important and act as an overarching legal framework for the Medicaid 
managed care agreement itself. 
 
For purposes of this review, we identified remedies typically used in Medicaid 
and SCHIP contracts in conjunction with a pediatric performance standard based on the 
requirement under Medicaid statute and regulation that children receive appropriate 
immunizations according to the schedule recommended by the CDC Advisory 
Committee on Immunization Practices.41  Our prior reviews of Medicaid and SCHIP 
contracts42 revealed 11 basic types of remedies that one or more state Medicaid and or 
                                       
36 The CHSRP contract database, assembled with support from the David and Lucille Packard 
Foundation,   
 contains Medicaid and SCHIP contracts in effect on March 31, 2000,  Negotiating the New Health System, 
4th Edition,  www.gwhealthpolicy.org/managed_care.htm.    
37 The Urban Institute’s Assessing the New Federalism study covers 13 states (AL, CA, CO, FL, MA, MI, MN, 
MS, NJ, NY, TX, WA, WI and DC), http://www.urban.org.  Because Alabama did not enter into any risk 
contracts with MCOs during 2000, it is not included in this analysis. 
38 The Center for the Study of Health Systems Change is studying 12 communities, including Phoenix, AZ; 
Indianapolis, IN; Cleveland, OH; and Greenville, SC. http://www.hschange.org/. 
39 http://www.cms.gov/medicaid/managedcare/mcsten02.pdf  Data as of June 30, 2002.; 
http://www.cms.gov/schip/ and Austein Casnoff, op.cit. 
40 See Bailit Health Purchasing, LLC (March, 2002)  Recommended Health Care Markets for Provider 
Incentive Demonstrations,  http://www.nhcpi.net/pdf/incentives.pdf, regarding the use of incentives in 
Medicaid managed care.   
41 Section 1905(r)(1)(B)(iii); 42 C.F.R. 441.56(c)(3). 
42 GW Center for Health Services Research and Policy, Negotiating the New Health System:  State Children’s 
Health Insurance Programs, Fourth Edition, Washington, DC:  The George Washington University, Center 
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SCHIP agencies have incorporated into their contracts with MCOs in order to enforce 
compliance with the requirements of the contract.43  These remedies are set forth below. 
  
Figure 5.  Managed Care Contractual Remedies 
 
 
Types of Remedies in State Medicaid and SCHIP 
Risk Contracts with MCOs 
 
Corrective action plans 
Liquidated/exemplary damages 
Suspension of new enrollment 
Disenrollment of current enrollees 
Withholding from capitation payments 
MCO payment for out-of-plan care 
State payment to out-of-plan provider 
Adjusting capitation payment rates 
Receivership by state Medicaid agency 
Termination or non-renewal of contract 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
There is a dramatic difference between contract termination and any of the other 
remedies listed above.  Termination represents the end of the business relationship 
between the state purchaser and the MCO; if the MCO does not have a significant 
enrollment of individuals who are not Medicaid or SCHIP beneficiaries, then termination 
also represents the commercial demise of the MCO.  Because termination is such a 
harsh remedy, it is not commonly invoked; instead, purchasers rely on the imposition 
(or the threat of imposition) of intermediate sanctions to deter noncompliance with 
contract requirements and, when noncompliance occurs, to cure it.   
 
The use of intermediate sanctions has particular logic in the case of pediatric 
performance standards, for example the CDC Advisory Committee’s childhood 
immunization specifications.  This performance standard is an important marker of the 
extent to which an MCO is complying with Medicaid program requirements as well as 
the quality of pediatric care the MCO offers.  However, this performance standard does 
not measure the range of the MCO’s responsibilities vis-à-vis its child enrollees, and an 
MCO that does not meet the immunization performance standard could be performing 
most of its other pediatric care responsibilities adequately.  In such circumstances, 
contract termination would serve no useful purpose.  The imposition of one or more 
intermediate remedies that target and are proportionate to the performance standard and 
the degree of noncompliance is likely to be much more effective at inducing 
compliance by the MCO.  
 
                                                                                                                           
for Health Services Research and Policy, 
http://www.gwu.edu/~chsrp/Fourth_Edition/CHIP/schiptoc.html. 
43 Ibid., Table 6.4. 
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A similar review of contracts in effect in 2000 between state SCHIP agencies and 
MCOs found that these contracts contained 9 of the 11 types of remedies present in the 
Medicaid risk contracts.  In this prior review, we identified two notable remedies 
available to Medicaid purchasers but not incorporated into SCHIP contracts that exist 
independent of the Medicaid agreement under separately administered SCHIP programs.  
These two remedies involve situations in which a company’s network is unable to 
furnish contractual care, a problem that is by no means unique to Medicaid (indeed, 
access to out-of-network providers is a major focus of state managed care oversight 
generally).44  The remedies permit an agency to either require the MCO to pay for 
contractual care that it cannot furnish through its own network or to pay for the out-of-
network care and recoup from the contractor.  The potential for network failure 
apparently was less of a concern to state SCHIP agencies, since these remedies did not 
appear in the SCHIP contracts.     
 
 
                                       
44 Butler, P. (August, 2001). Comparison of State Managed Care Liability Laws. Washington, DC: Kaiser 
Family Foundation, http://www.kff.org/content/2001/3155/MCOReport.pdf. 
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c. Sanctions in Medicaid and SCHIP Managed Care Contracts, 2000  
 
In our review of the 16 focus states in this study, we examined contracts in effect 
during the 2000 time period. Figure 6 illustrates the frequency of contractual recourse to 
seven specified remedies for ten SCHIP states and 15 Medicaid states.  Tables A.I 
through A.IV below provide details on the various intermediate sanctions that appear in 
the two groups of contracts and compare Medicaid and SCHIP agency approaches. A 
discussion of the remedies and the tables follow.  Additional tables are in Appendix I. 
 
Overview 
 
 Type of remedy by frequency.  The most frequently described remedy for 
noncompliance in both the SCHIP and Medicaid contracts is termination or non-renewal 
of the contract.   Unlike Medicaid, however, withholding from capitation payments was 
the remedy least frequently described in SCHIP managed care contracts. The majority of 
SCHIP contracts cited recourse to corrective action plans; this was the second most 
frequently cited sanction in SCHIP contracts and the sixth for Medicaid.  Three of the 
seven SCHIP contracts and 14 of the 15 Medicaid contracts also included suspension of 
new enrollment and liquidated or exemplary damages as remedies for noncompliance.    
 
Figure 6. Percent of States with Contractual Recourse to Specified 
Remedies in Medicaid and SCHIP Contracts
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Termination or non-renewal of contract
Receivership by state Medicaid agency
Adjusting capitation payment rates
State payment to out-of-plan provider
MCO payment for out-of-plan care
Withholding from capitation payments
Disenrollment of current enrollees
Suspension of new enrollment
Liquidated or exemplary damages
Corrective action plans
Percent
SCHIP
Medicaid
SCHIP: n = 7 
Medicaid: n = 15 
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State payments to out-of-plan providers recouped from plans and mandatory 
MCO payment for out-of-plan care were the remedies least frequently described in 
Medicaid managed care contracts and neither is cited by any of the SCHIP contracts 
analyzed.  SCHIP contracts did not contain the following remedies: receivership, 
adjustment of capitation rates, state payment to out-of-plan provider recouped from 
MCO, MCO payment for out-of-plan care, and disenrollment of current enrollees.  Like 
Medicaid, a general and nonspecific failure to comply with the contract was 
systematically one of the top reasons for employing the remedy. 
  
Total number of remedies by state.  Massachusetts Medicaid included the most 
number of available remedies in the contract, while California and Michigan were the 
states with the lowest number of remedies available.  The California SCHIP contract, 
however, contained the highest number of remedies of all the SCHIP contracts 
analyzed.  Similar to Medicaid, Michigan was one of two states with the lowest number 
of remedies included in the separate SCHIP contract. 
 
Individual Remedies and the Uppermost Reasons for Imposing Them 
 
 Corrective action plans.  Seven Medicaid contracts included language for 
imposing corrective action plans.  The most frequently cited reasons for requesting such 
plans included failure to comply with the contract and failure to provide quality care.  
Four SCHIP contracts authorized the use of corrective action plans, most frequently in 
response to a failure to comply with the contract.  Other reasons for the use of 
corrective action plans identified in SCHIP contracts were knowledge that 
representations or warranties regarding a participating provider may be untrue or 
incorrect, hindrance of enrollee access to covered services due to inability of providers 
within the plan to accept additional enrollees as patients, and a deficiency or event 
causing an assessment of a liquidated damage. 
 
 Liquidated or exemplary damages.  The majority of Medicaid states and three 
SCHIP states included provisions in their Medicaid contracts on liquidated or exemplary 
damages to sanction a variety of MCO behaviors.   The most frequently described basis 
for imposing this type of remedy in Medicaid contracts was MCO failure to comply with 
the contract, followed closely by MCO failure to submit data, medical records, or other 
information or to submit them in the required form or format by a specified deadline, 
and MCO failure to comply with federal laws and regulations.  For SCHIP, the most 
frequently cited basis for instituting this remedy was failure to comply with objective 
performance standards monitored by the state. 
 
 Suspension of new enrollment.  The majority of Medicaid and three SCHIP states 
gave the Medicaid or SCHIP agency the contractual authority to suspend new 
enrollment.  Principal reasons for suspending enrollment were failure to comply with 
the contract (Medicaid and SCHIP); and, failure to comply with marketing guidelines 
and failure to comply with state laws and regulations (Medicaid only). 
 
 Disenrollment of current enrollees.  Six states used disenrollment of current 
enrollees as a remedy against participating MCOs.  The most frequently cited reasons for 
imposing this remedy were failure to comply with the contract and the failure to provide 
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services, followed by failure to comply with federal laws and regulations and failure to 
maintain or provide records.  None of the SCHIP contracts included this remedy. 
 
Withholding from capitation payments.  While the majority of Medicaid states 
included withholding from capitation payments as a sanction under certain 
circumstances, only two SCHIP states included such a remedy in their contracts.  Most 
often, Medicaid contracts cited failure to comply with the contract, failure to provide 
medically necessary services, discrimination in employment, and termination as reasons 
for withholding from capitation payments.  Other reasons included failure to comply 
with federal laws and regulations, failure to comply with state laws and regulations, 
failure to comply with financial soundness requirements, failure to comply with 
reporting requirements, misrepresentation or falsification of information, and failure to 
comply with physician incentive plan requirements.  The two SCHIP states included 
failure to comply with the contract and failure to make payments to the Consumer 
Assessment of Health Plans (CAHPS) vendor for reasons for employing this sanction. 
 
 MCO payment for out-of-plan care.  Only one Medicaid contract required MCOs to 
pay for out-of-plan care when they failed to comply with the contract or failed to 
comply with laws and regulations. 
 
 Recoupment of state payment to out-of-plan providers.  Only one Medicaid contract 
had the contractual authority to recoup from MCOs state payments to out-of-plan 
providers for failure to reimburse covered services after receiving a monthly prepayment 
to provide these services and when an enrollee has moved outside of the MCO’s service 
area.   
 
 Adjustment of capitation rates.  Nine Medicaid contracts included the option to 
adjust capitation rates as a remedy against plan violations, most frequently in response 
to a failure to comply with the contract or a failure to submit data. None of the SCHIP 
contracts analyzed described this remedy. 
 
 Receivership.  Five Medicaid contracts described receivership as one option 
against specified MCO behavior, such as failure to comply with the contract, failure to 
comply with federal laws and regulations, MCO action amounting to egregious behavior, 
and MCO action posing a substantial risk to the health of enrollees.   
 
 Termination.  All Medicaid states and all but one SCHIP state included 
termination clauses in their contracts both for contractor violations and other reasons 
independent of contractor behavior.  In the long list of contractor violations, failure to 
comply with the contract, failure to maintain financial viability or meet financial 
soundness requirements, loss of qualification for licensure, certificate of authority, or 
certification, failure to comply with federal laws and regulations, and unremedied 
breach within a specified time period topped the list for Medicaid.  The protection of 
enrollees from injury, the best interest of the state, and the protection of state or federal 
funds or property were the top three other reasons enabling states to terminate the 
contract.  Top contractor violations in SCHIP contracts included failure to comply with 
the contract, failure to meet statutory financial requirements or to comply with solvency 
requirements, and assignment for the benefit of creditors, appointment of receiver, or 
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bankruptcy proceedings.  Lack of funding or appropriated funds was the leading other 
reason enabling states to terminate the contract.   
 
State Law Remedies External to Contract 
 
Contracts between state Medicaid or SCHIP purchasers and MCOs are governed 
primarily by state and federal Medicaid and SCHIP laws.  These laws may be expressly 
referenced in the contracts or may be covered in a broad reference to “all applicable 
state and federal laws and regulations.”  Other state laws also apply to these 
arrangements or to the MCO doing business with the state Medicaid agency.  For 
example, most states have laws requiring MCOs doing business in the state to obtain a 
license, and some states have enacted legislation prohibiting the submission of false 
claims by Medicaid providers.  These other laws, in turn, contain remedies for 
noncompliance with their requirements.  These remedies, however, are not tools that 
will realistically enable state purchasing agencies, other state regulatory officials, or the 
state courts to hold MCO contractors accountable for compliance with pediatric 
performance standards.   
 
Medicaid Law 
 
States that contract on a risk basis with MCOs are required under federal law to 
“establish” intermediate sanctions in connection with certain specific offenses.45 Federal 
law is silent as to whether the intermediate sanctions are contained in statute, regulation, 
or in the risk contract itself.  At a minimum, the state Medicaid agency must have 
available to it the following two intermediate sanctions: appointment of temporary 
management; and permitting enrollees to disenroll without cause and notifying the 
enrollees of their right to do so.46  The state may also adopt one or more of the 
following intermediate sanctions: civil money penalties; suspension of new enrollment 
(including default enrollment); and suspension of capitation payments until the reason 
for the sanction no longer exists and is not likely to re-occur.47  States may establish 
additional sanctions at their discretion.48  States are not required to impose intermediate 
sanctions except in one circumstance: if the state finds that an MCO “has repeatedly 
failed to meet” federal statutory requirements.49
                                       
45 Section 1932(e)(1)(A) of the Social Security Act, as implemented by 42 CFR 438.700.  States must be in 
compliance by June 13, 2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 40989 (June 14, 2002). 
46 67 Fed. Reg. 41067; 42 CFR 483.706(b). States must be in compliance by June 13, 2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 
40989 (June 14, 2002). 
47 42 CFR 438.702(a).  States must be in compliance by June 13, 2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 40989 (June 14, 2002). 
48 42 CFR 438.702(b). 
49 Section 1932(e)(3) of the Social Security Act, as implemented by 42 CFR 438.706(b).  States must be in 
compliance by June 13, 2003, 67 Fed. Reg. 40989 (June 14, 2002). 
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Part II.   State Experiences with Monitoring Contract Enforcement 
 
 
Considerable attention has been paid to the development of clinical performance 
measurement and initiatives aimed at upgrading the clinical quality of care around key 
health problems (e.g., under-immunization, pediatric asthma).  But far less attention has 
been devoted to the study of how these quality improvement efforts become integrated 
with the elements of contractor accountability: specification, compensation, and 
performance oversight, including direct access to patient protections. 
 
Studies on monitoring and enforcement of Medicaid managed care are sparse as 
are studies of monitoring SCHIP contractor performance (this is not surprising, given the 
recent nature of the SCHIP program).  One GAO study focused on four states’ general 
efforts in monitoring Medicaid managed care programs and ensuring plan compliance 
with the access and data collection requirements of the contracts. 50  That study, 
however, did not focus on pediatric health care.  A second, more recent GAO study 
examined efforts to implement Medicaid EPSDT services in five states.51  This second 
study did not examine contractual enforcement, although it theorized certain managed 
care-related contractual enforcement strategies as a means of improving access and 
quality.  Other recent studies have focused on specific components of managed care 
performance monitoring, such as the use of performance incentives, early warning 
systems, and data reporting.52  Again, these studies are not specific to pediatric health 
care and do not tie these approaches to contracting practices.  At the same time, the 
small body of research that does exist suggests that compliance monitoring matters and 
that noncompliance is a problem.   
 
This phase of our analysis attempts to fill this gap by examining state contractual 
monitoring practices under Medicaid and SCHIP by combining an analysis of 
contractual provisions with interviews with state officials regarding their experiences in 
monitoring and enforcing two specific pediatric health standards.   
 
 
A. Study Design 
 
 
This phase of the study explores:  1) the logic behind a state’s selection of certain 
conditions to emphasize in its contractual specifications; 2) similarities and differences 
in how states with comparable areas of child health emphasis approach enforcement; 3) 
the extent to which the contracts were written to reflect existing standards, or modify or 
replace current standards; and 4) how states developed their expectations regarding 
contractor performance and monitored actual performance against those expectations.   
                                       
50 General Accounting Office, Medicaid Managed Care: Challenge of Holding Plans Accountable Requires 
Greater State Effort (GAO/HEHS-97-86, 1997), http://www.gao.gov. 
51 General Accounting Office, Medicaid: Stronger Efforts Needed to Ensure Children’s Access to Health 
Screening Services (GAO-01-749, 2001), http://www.gao.gov. 
52 See, e.g., Dyer, M.B., Bailit, M., and Kokenyesi, C. (2002).  Are Incentives Effective in Improving the 
Performance of Managed Care Plans? Washington, DC: Center for Health Care Strategies, 
http://www.chcs.org/publications/pdf/ips/bailitperformance.pdf;  Dichter, H, M.D., (2002). Monitoring 
Medicaid Managed Care via an Early Warning Program.  Washington, DC: Center for Health Care 
Strategies, http://www.chcs.org/publications/pdf/ips/earlywarning.pdf. 
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Because of the sheer breadth of managed care contracts, as well as our desire to 
delve beyond generalized assertions regarding enforcement and to examine 
enforcement experiences in the context of actual childhood health conditions, we 
selected two pediatric health condition “markers” for analysis.  Following consultation 
with pediatric experts, examination of the contracts themselves, and a review of 
literature on child health, we selected markers of child health that are tied to both high 
prevalence and low prevalence child health conditions, and represented in Medicaid 
and SCHIP managed care contracts in terms of reasonably clear contractual 
specifications, thereby lending themselves to an exploration of state oversight 
experiences.  Our assumption was that if a state was sufficiently concerned with a 
particular child health condition to address it with some specificity in the contract, the 
condition presumably would be one that a state intended to focus on as part of its 
oversight efforts.  
 
We selected conditions that not only were representative of both high and low 
prevalence problems but that also, in their comprehensiveness as reflected in the 
contracts, suggested a state’s desire to move beyond what a contractor might be 
expected to do as a matter of professional industry custom.  In any Medicaid managed 
care contract, one would expect that managed care contractors would adhere to 
professional health practice in the provision of both low and high prevalence pediatric 
care.  The fact that states choose to emphasize certain services at length suggests that 
they wish to maintain a special and elevated focus on a particular child health problem 
above and beyond what professional custom alone might produce.   
 
The study design was qualitative and combined document analyses of state 
managed care contracts and other legal documents with semi-structured telephone 
interviews with officials from Medicaid and SCHIP agencies, as well as other agencies 
involved in contract oversight, when appropriate.  
 
Pediatric standards of care and performance standards related to these standards 
of care were selected to represent standards common to all pediatric managed care 
arrangements and to reflect both high and low prevalence childhood conditions.  The 
two conditions that we selected were oral disease and childhood lead poisoning.  Figure 
7 describes the prevalences and the potential sequelae of oral disease and lead 
poisoning. 
Figure 7.  Comparison of the Prevalence of Oral Disease and Lead Poisoning53  
 
Prevalence of  
oral disease  
 
(high 
prevalence 
condition) 
Oral diseases and conditions can have serious short-term and long-term consequences for 
a child’s growth, function, ability to learn, self-image, and employability.  Today, tooth 
decay is the single most common chronic childhood disease, affecting approximately 20% 
of preschoolers, 50% of 6-8 year olds, and 75% of 15 year olds.  The prevalence of 
dental caries is higher for low-income children.  Analyses of data from a nationally 
representative sample of children show that the amount of tooth decay in children is 
                                       
53 Sources: Children’s Dental Health Project (2003). At-a-Glance Pediatric Oral Health & Oral Health 
Disparities; At-a-Glance Medicaid & SCHIP Dental Programs, http://www.childent.org; American Dental 
Association (2003). Fact Sheet—Children’s Dental Disease, http://www.ada.org; Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention. (2000). Blood Lead Levels in Young Children—United States and Selected States, 
1996-1999, http:/www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm4950a3.htm.  
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inversely related to income level, suggesting that Medicaid children have a higher 
prevalence of dental caries than SCHIP children, who in turn have a higher prevalence of 
dental caries than higher income children not enrolled in SCHIP.  Data by state are not 
readily available.   
***The Healthy People 2010 Objective 21-1 is to reduce the proportion of children and 
adolescents who experience dental caries in their primary or permanent teeth. 
Prevalence of  
lead poisoning  
 
(low prevalence 
condition) 
Lead poisoning has the potential to damage a child’s central nervous system, kidneys, and 
reproductive system.  At high levels, it is associated with decreased intelligence, impaired 
neurobehavioral development and hearing acuity, decreased stature and growth, and 
sometimes, death.  Today, lead poisoning is a low prevalence condition.  Blood lead 
levels are highest for younger children and for children who are poor (i.e., with family 
incomes below 100% of the federal poverty level).  In 1999-2000, 300,000 children ages 
1-5, or approximately 2% of children in that age group, had elevated blood lead levels, 
representing a 2.4% drop since 1991-1994.  In 1991-1994, the prevalence of lead 
poisoning among Medicaid-covered children ages 1-5 was 9%, compared to 3% among 
children not covered by Medicaid.  Aggregate SCHIP data are not available, but 
presumably would show a prevalence among SCHIP-covered children lower than that for 
Medicaid yet higher than for the general population. The estimated prevalence of 
elevated blood lead levels across seven of the nine study states ranges from a low of 
3.8% to a high of 16%, with a midpoint estimate of 7.4% (the rate for the two remaining 
states is unknown).  Within states, the prevalence rate varies considerably as well.  For 
example, in one state, where the statewide prevalence rate is approximately 13%, the 
proportion of children with elevated blood lead levels ranges from a low of 1.3% to a 
high of 27.3%, depending on the county.   
***The Healthy People 2010 Objective 8-11 is to eliminate elevated blood lead levels in 
children.        
 
Oral disease represents one of the most prevalent and disparate conditions 
affecting low income children, with both short-term and long-term consequences.54  
There is an extensive body of literature on the problem,55 as well as practice guidelines 
that define accepted interventions at preventive, acute, long term and emergency care 
stages.56  Oral health improvement has been a specific quality improvement target 
among federal and state Medicaid agencies and many managed care plans have been 
involved in oral health improvement efforts.57  Oral health also is a specific service 
mentioned in 39 of the 42 comprehensive physical health Medicaid contracts and 13 of 
the 15 SCHIP contracts in our contracts database.58   
 
The second condition selected was blood lead levels sufficiently elevated to 
require treatment.  This condition was selected because of its public health 
importance,59 its long-term effects on children,60 its recognized severity as a condition 
requiring immediate treatment,61 and the intensity of focus that has been given to the 
                                       
54 Nolan, L., Kamoie, B., Harvey, J., Vaquerano, L., Blake, S., Chawla, S., Levi, J., and Rosenbaum, S. 
(January, 2003). The Effects of State Dental Practice Laws Allowing Alternative Models of Preventive Oral 
Health Care Delivery to Low-Income Children, 
http://www.gwhealthpolicy.org/downloads/Oral_Health.pdf. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Ibid. 
57 Ibid. 
58 Negotiating the New Health System, op cit., http://www.gwu.edu/%7Echsrp/Fourth_Edition/. 
59 Farmer, C. (2003). Lead Screening for Children Enrolled in Medicaid: State Approaches.  Washington, 
DC:  National Conference of State Legislatures Promising Practices Issue Brief. See also GW Center for 
Health Services Research and Policy, (1998) Medicaid Managed Care Contracting for Childhood Lead 
Poisoning Prevention Services. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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threat of lead poisoning in low-income communities at both the federal and state levels 
over the years.62    
 
Sixteen states encompassing 27 Medicaid managed care and separate SCHIP 
programs with full-risk managed care contracts in existence (whether these contracts are 
separate from each other or integrated with each other) were included for potential 
participation in the study: Arizona, California, Colorado, Florida, Indiana, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, New Jersey, New York, South Carolina, Texas, Ohio, 
Washington, and Wisconsin.  These states mirror those studied by the previously 
mentioned Urban Institute and Center for Studying Health Systems Change in their 
ongoing studies of federalism and market change.  They also comprise more than half 
of the nation’s population, and a broad range of fiscal capacity, child well-being, 
managed care markets, and approaches to government programs.   
 
A total of nine states and 15 programs (eight Medicaid managed care programs 
and seven separate SCHIP programs) chose to participate in the study, representing a 
response rate of 56 percent.  The remaining seven states declined to participate for 
various reasons.63  
 
 
B. Data Collection and Methods  
 
 
Data were collected and analyzed according to a theoretical framework 
developed from a combination of sources, including the literature on policy 
implementation and the available research on oversight in a Medicaid managed care 
context.  The theoretical framework delineates the key components of an effective state 
monitoring plan and incorporates ten elements that have been identified by 
implementation theorists as important to successful implementation (see Figure 8).  It is 
important to note that this framework was not prescriptive but rather a guide for 
conducting the study and developing the research questions (see interview guide, 
attached).    
 
Figure 8.  Key Components of an Effective State Monitoring Plan64  
 
Formal Plan with Clear 
Goals, Assignments, 
Measurements, and 
Policy goals have been clearly stated (element one); precise standards for 
measuring compliance with policy goals have been specified (element 
two); agency for implementing and enforcing the policy has been set up 
                                       
62 Ibid. 
63 Reasons given for declining to participate included: the legislative session and the demands it 
imposed on the agency; current fiscal pressures; shortage of staff; structure of the program, which did not 
lend itself to what was perceived as a useful contribution to the study; absence of focus of the quality 
improvement plan on lead poisoning and oral health or the beginning of the development of a plan on 
lead poisoning and oral health; low levels of managed care participation in the program; a belief in 
improving quality through other means than the contract; or the perceived lack of utility of research such 
as this for an individual state. 
64 Bullock, C. and Lamb, C. (1984). A Search for Variables Important in Policy Implementation. in 
Bullock, C. and Lamb, C. [Eds] Implementation of Civil Rights Policy New York, NY: Brooks Cole; General 
Accounting Office. Medicaid Managed Care: Challenge of Holding Plans Accountable Requires Greater 
State Effort (GAO/HEHS-97-86, 1997); National Medicaid Fraud and Abuse Initiative. Guidelines for 
Addressing Fraud and Abuse in Medicaid Managed Care (Department of Health and Human Services, 
Baltimore, MD, 2000). 
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Milestones (element four); multi-faceted support exists toward the policy goals, i.e., the 
personnel responsible for implementation are committed to promoting the 
policy goals (element five), those enforcing the policy enjoy the support of 
their superiors (element six), and the policy beneficiaries are organized and 
cohesively support implementation of the policy goals (element seven). 
Prevention Strategies 
Strategies to prevent implementation problems, including specifying 
contract requirements in the following areas: service components and 
service periodicity schedule; adequacy of provider network, travel 
distances, and waiting times; and adequacy of medical care provided and 
beneficiary satisfaction. 
Coordination Strategies The various agencies responsible for achieving the policy goals administratively coordinate their efforts (element eight).  
Detection Strategies 
A mechanism for monitoring compliance has been created (element three); 
quantifiable standards have been developed to measure performance and 
information is collected to measure plan compliance with standard; analysis 
and investigation are independently conducted by the state or other 
external organization rather than plan-conducted. 
Enforcement Strategies General approach is proactive, systematic, ongoing rather than reactive, periodic; incentives and penalties favor compliance (element nine). 
Reporting Strategies 
Federal government is an active participant on behalf of those protected by 
the policy (element ten); state reports back to the federal government for 
additional sanctions beyond the purview of the state. 
 
Data were collected from two main sources of information.  First, service and 
enforcement provisions found in Medicaid and SCHIP managed care contracts collected 
for CHSRP’s ongoing study entitled “Negotiating the New Health Care System,”65 as well 
as federal and state laws, including federal and state Medicaid statutes and regulations, 
federal and state SCHIP statutes and regulations, federal and state HMO acts, and federal 
and state procurement laws, when appropriate.   
 
The second source of information consisted of telephone interviews with state 
government officials that were used to complete, corroborate, and clarify the 
documentary evidence.  In these interviews, we discussed specific contract 
requirements, state oversight activities, and state actions available or taken as a result of 
monitoring.66  A wide range of officials were included, including both Medicaid and 
SCHIP agency staff.67  We sought information about contract enforcement issues state 
officials faced as well as information on the extent to which contract drafting created 
additional problems in enforcement.  This last point was of particular interest; since we 
began the contracts project nearly a decade ago, we have given specific focus to noting 
potential ramifications of vague language from an enforcement viewpoint.   
 
Data were analyzed across states to describe the logic of Medicaid and SCHIP 
contract performance standards selection and the similarities and differences in state 
                                       
65 Negotiating the New Health System [4th Ed.], op. cit.  
66 To protect the privacy of interviewees, all interviews with state officials were treated as confidential, 
informed consent procedures were followed, and only written notes were taken.  No individual 
information that personally identifies an individual by name is published in this paper.  This research 
project was reviewed for human subject protections by the George Washington University Medical Center 
Institutional Review Board and received approval on July 20, 2002 (IRB# U080227ER). 
67 We also asked Medicaid and SCHIP interviewees to refer us to representatives from other agencies, e.g., 
Attorney General’s offices, departments of insurance, as well as representatives from participating health 
plans whom they felt were appropriate for some follow-up questioning.  Because of the low level of 
responses and the lack of representativeness obtained through this request, we decided to postpone this 
component of this study to a later date. 
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monitoring plans by degree of managed care penetration, type of program design, and 
prevalence of the condition targeted by the contractual performance standard. 
 
 
C. Analysis of Contract and Interview Findings 
 
 
a. Medicaid and SCHIP Contract Performance Standards Selection 
 
In this part, we analyze how state contracts reinforce existing professional 
standards and industry norms and develop new standards of care that attempt to raise 
the bar in health care quality for children. 
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1. Dental Care 
 
Typically, in the private sector, dental services are not included in the contractual 
obligations of managed care organizations.  Rather, they are optional and furnished 
through alternate systems of care.  In contrast, in the Medicaid program, at least in the 
case of children, states must cover EPSDT services, which include oral screenings and 
referrals to dentists as part of the physical examination required under the program.  In 
addition, other necessary care (i.e., diagnosis, treatment) discovered by the screen 
should be covered.  At a minimum, other dental care should include emergency, 
preventive and therapeutic services, as defined in law, to relieve pain and infections, 
restore teeth, and maintain dental health.   
 
States must provide dental services at intervals that meet reasonable standards of 
medical and dental practice and should consult with recognized medical and dental 
organizations involved in children’s health care in setting these standards.  However, 
there are differences of opinion among these professional associations on what the 
periodicity schedule should look like.  The American Dental Association (ADA), 
American Academy of Pediatrics (AAP),68 and American Academy of Family Physicians 
(AAFP) recommend a direct referral to a dentist at age 3 or earlier if medically necessary 
and greater frequency of dental visits than physical examinations for older children (a 
practice also supported, albeit no longer required, by the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (CMS)).  The American Academy of Pediatric Dentistry (AAPD), on 
the other hand, recommends a dental visit within six months of the eruption of the first 
tooth and no later than a child’s first birthday, and subsequently a minimum of two 
visits per year.   
 
Generally speaking, separate SCHIP programs have more flexibility to determine 
which benefits they will cover.   SCHIP requires states to provide benefits that are 
actuarially-equivalent to a benchmark benefit package (e.g., state employee benefit plan) 
for basic services, which must include well-baby and well-child care.  Unlike Medicaid, 
dental care is not specifically listed as a component of well-baby and well-child care in 
the SCHIP program. 
 
We asked state Medicaid and SCHIP officials why they set the oral health 
standards as they had in the contract.  The most striking difference came from the 
fact that Medicaid programs, including SCHIP Medicaid expansion programs, and 
separate SCHIP programs are governed by two separate sets of rules.   
 
Medicaid officials almost uniformly cited the federal ESPDT requirements as the 
driving force for their oral health standards.  While the majority of these officials 
believed that, or did not venture a guess as to whether, their standards reflected current 
federal requirements, professional standards, and industry norms, officials in two states 
thought theirs went a step further because they had “beefed up” the existing preventive 
guidelines with additional requirements.   In the first state, officials added two 
requirements: 1) that primary care physicians perform oral screens at each well-child 
                                       
68 Since this research took place, the AAP changed its policy and joined the AAPD in recommending the 
establishment of a dental home by referring a child for an oral health examination by a dentist 6months 
after the first tooth erupts or by 12 months of age. 
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visit and refer children to dental services when necessary, and 2) that managed care 
organizations guarantee open access or self-referral to oral health services for children 
and notify families when the annual visit is due.   
 
In the second state, officials further defined what the examination of the oral 
cavity should entail, by requiring that medical providers “look at the teeth” not just the 
tonsils, perform various educational activities, and refer to dental providers using “First 
Tooth, First Birthday, First Dental Visit” as a guide for the age of referral, an approach 
similar to the one recommended by the AAPD.  The state still faces difficulties with the 
referral component because the AMA, ADA, and AAPD differ on the age of referral 
(e.g., one says age three, the other with the sighting of the disease) and because 
providers remain confused as to which standard applies.  
 
SCHIP officials, on the other hand, pointed to the flexibility of the SCHIP statute 
and regulations, which do not set federal standards in the area of oral health.  The three 
separate SCHIP programs represented in this study all covered dental care and explicitly 
listed components of that care in their contracts.  Two of these three programs also 
referred in their contracts to a specific periodicity schedule for providers to follow, the 
AAP schedule in the first case and the AAPD schedule in the second case.  The third 
contract was silent on this issue, but the state official representing the program 
explained that the dental care component was based in large part on the Medicaid 
managed care model, particularly in the area of oral health assessments, which requires 
plans to follow the AAP periodicity schedule.  One state official believed that their 
dental care standards went beyond industry norms because they had used the state 
employee benefit plan as a benchmark for the SCHIP benefit package and augmented it 
with the AAP standard of “screen and refer at age three.”  State officials in the second 
state thought their standards reflected industry practice because the choice of the AAPD 
standard was based on the recommendations to the Commission set up to design the 
SCHIP program by a dentist.  The state official in the third state was unsure whether 
theirs represented an advance beyond existing standards.  
 
We asked state Medicaid and SCHIP officials how the pediatric oral health 
standards contained in their managed care contracts were arrived at and 
negotiated with contractors.   There were basically two groups of states: those that 
made the pediatric oral health standards of their contracts nonnegotiable and those that 
negotiated them in some fashion.  Half of the states fell into the first group and did not 
negotiate this aspect of the contract because it was in essence predetermined by the 
EPSDT requirements at the federal level or it was added to the RFP as a minimum, 
nonnegotiable requirement.  The other half of the states took varied approaches to 
negotiation and involved health plans at different stages of the process, but they all 
underscored that it facilitated buy-in on the part of health plans and thus lessened the 
opposition of health plans to the oral health standards that resulted in the contract.  
Three states involved health plans early on in the development stage of the standards 
either through formal discussions where the state entity responsible for setting policy on 
oral health made the final decision or through informal discussions where group 
decisions were made based on the best dental practice in existence at the time.  A 
fourth state involved health plans at the RFP stage, which, according to state officials, 
provided a forum for health plans to voice their concerns.  In that state, during the RFP 
process, the state proposed a set of performance measures for dental and well-child 
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care and the plans suggested national Health Employer Data Information Set (HEDIS) 
measures instead.  In the end, the state adopted a set of measures very similar to 
HEDIS.   
 
Finally, we asked agency officials how important the capacity to measure 
the standard was and what was the anticipated approach to performance 
measurement.  We found that although the majority of states expected health plans to 
show improvement from year to year, the level of sophistication of states’ approaches to 
measuring health plan performance and compliance with the pediatric oral health 
standards of the contract varied widely from state to state (Table 1 in Appendix II).  
Eight programs had developed one or more clinical performance measures, and of 
those, three had made them specific to dental care, and five relied on the broader 
EPSDT well-child visit measure.  In addition, half of those that did not have measures 
specific to dental care also used dental statistics to track the utilization rate of dental 
services.  Two programs did not have any performance measures in place, but both 
used dental statistics to track the rate of dental services.  State officials in the ninth state 
explained that, because of the very low level of managed care penetration in the state, 
they decided to focus on ensuring access to care and to address quality improvement 
later when it would be a more feasible proposition.  To that end, they developed a 
quantifiable geographic access standard (e.g., 90 percent of children must have access 
to a pediatrician within 10 miles of their homes).  Though specific to pediatric care, it 
does not address access to dental providers. 
 
 
2.  Lead Screening Services 
 
Generally, the perception in the private sector—health plans and health 
professionals alike—is that the condition of childhood lead poisoning does not merit 
the investment of often scarce resources the federal government allocates in several of 
its public health and public insurance programs.  This perception is reinforced by the 
low prevalence of the disease, which today affects only approximately two percent of 
children ages 1-5, and the current AAP guidelines, which recommend targeted blood 
lead level testing for children at ages 12 and 24 months based on the results of a health 
risk assessment indicating the potential for elevated blood lead levels.69   
 
In contrast to the private sector, the detection and the treatment of childhood 
lead poisoning is an important priority in the public sector.  The Healthy People 2010 
Objective 8-11 is to eliminate elevated blood lead levels in children.  To this end, the 
U.S. Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has developed a strategic plan 
for the elimination of childhood lead poisoning, which includes an effort to build a 
national surveillance system for monitoring children’s blood lead levels.70  CDC 
recommends that states make public and private laboratories, including out-of-state 
laboratories performing tests for residents of other states, the basis of their surveillance 
system because, unlike oral disease, lead poisoning is usually a laboratory diagnosis that 
does not require clinical judgment.   
                                       
69 Committee on Practice and Ambulatory Medicine, Recommendations for Preventive Pediatric Health 
Care, Washington, DC” American Academy of Pediatrics, http://www.aap.org. 
70 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1991) Strategic Plan for the Elimination of Childhood Lead 
Poisoning Atlanta, GA: Department of Health and Human Services. 
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According to CDC data, the majority of states (58 percent) require reporting of 
blood lead levels in children (usually starting at birth), with two states mandating 
reporting of all blood lead test results and 18 states requiring reporting of elevated blood 
lead levels only.71  The majority of states with reporting requirements required reporting 
from state laboratories (76 percent) and in-state private laboratories (83 percent); about 
half of those states (49 percent) required reporting from both in-state and out-of-state 
private laboratories.72  The majority of states with reporting requirements also required 
reporting from physicians (79 percent).73   
 
Following CDC’s lead, CMS has made the detection and treatment of childhood 
lead poisoning a priority of the Medicaid program, which considers all children covered 
by the program at risk and thus needing universal blood lead level testing.  This policy 
is in stark contrast with the AAP policy of performing a health risk assessment first 
before a blood test is even considered.  Lead toxicity screening services are covered 
under EPSDT as part of the laboratory tests required under the program and must be 
provided according to the federally-specified periodicity schedule of the CDC Advisory 
Committee on Childhood Lead Poisoning Prevention.  A blood lead test must be 
included.  If a capillary specimen was used to perform the test and indicates elevated 
blood lead levels, it must be confirmed by a venous blood sample.  Follow-up medical 
and public health services must also be provided.   
 
In contrast to the Medicaid program, CMS has not made the detection and 
treatment of childhood lead poisoning a priority of the SCHIP program.  As was the 
case for dental care, separate SCHIP programs have more flexibility to determine which 
benefits they will cover, although they must provide benefits that are actuarially-
equivalent to the basic services provided under a benchmark benefit package (e.g., state 
employee benefit plan).  Basic services explicitly include well-baby and well-child care, 
but do not specify lead screening as a component of well-baby and well-child care. 
 
We asked state Medicaid and SCHIP officials why they had set the lead 
screening standards as they had in the contract.  As was the case for dental care, the 
most striking difference came from the fact that Medicaid programs, including SCHIP 
Medicaid expansion programs, and separate SCHIP programs are governed by two 
separate sets of rules.   
 
Medicaid officials almost uniformly cited the federal ESPDT requirements as the 
driving force for their lead screening standards.  Because the EPSDT requirements 
incorporate the CDC guidelines on the detection and treatment of lead poisoning in 
Medicaid-covered children, which represent an expansion beyond the current industry 
norm and professional practice in this area, officials from all but one state with 
Medicaid programs and SCHIP Medicaid expansion programs or separate SCHIP 
programs administered under the same contract as Medicaid believed that their 
standards went beyond existing clinical guidelines.   
                                       
71 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. (1992) “Surveillance of Children’s Blood Lead Levels—
United States, 1991”  MMWR 41(34): 620-622, 
http://http://ww.cdc.gov/epo/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00017471.htm.  
72 MMWR, op. cit.  Four study states required reporting from laboratories only, four additional states from 
both laboratories and physicians, and one state appeared not require either group of providers to report. 
73 MMWR, op. cit. 
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SCHIP officials representing the three separate SCHIP programs administered 
under a separate contract from Medicaid again pointed to the flexibility of the SCHIP 
statute and regulations, which do not set any federal standards in the area of lead 
screening.  As a result, they were free to depart from the EPSDT standards and all of 
them did.  In two states, the contract imposes a general requirement that, as part of 
periodic health examinations, laboratory tests be performed according to the AAP 
recommendations for preventive pediatric health care, which include a risk assessment 
prior to testing.  SCHIP officials representing one of these states explained that they had 
elected the AAP standards pertaining to the well-child visit because, in their view, it was 
the best way to tie in lead screening services without explicitly mentioning them.  They 
also believed that their choice reflected current industry practice.  The SCHIP official 
representing the second state recognized the lack of specificity of the contract language 
and further noted that lead screening does not appear to be on the minds of the 
commercial plans participating in the program.  In the third state, the contract is 
completely silent on the issue of laboratory tests, including blood lead level screens.  
However, the SCHIP official representing this state stated that participating plans are 
generally expected to follow the AAP standards and thus current industry practice. 
 
We also asked state Medicaid and SCHIP officials how the pediatric lead 
screening standards contained in their managed care contracts were arrived at and 
negotiated with contractors.  States took three main approaches to contract 
negotiation.  Under the first approach, three states made pediatric lead screening 
standards a nonnegotiable component of the HMO contract either because they were 
predetermined by the EPSDT requirements at the federal level (two states) or because it 
was included in the RFP as a minimum, nonnegotiable requirement (one state).  Under 
the second approach, four states, including all three separate SCHIP programs 
administered under a managed care contract independent from Medicaid and one state 
using a combined contractual document for its Medicaid and separate SCHIP programs, 
did not have to negotiate this aspect of the contract because the contract did not 
include any language specific to lead screening.  Under the third approach, states (a 
minority in this study) negotiated the standards in some fashion.  One state, which 
involves health plans at the RFP stage, used the RFP process to propose a set of 
performance measures for well-child care and the plans counter-proposed with national 
HEDIS measures instead.  In the end, the state adopted a set of modified HEDIS 
measures.  
 
Finally, we asked states how important was the capacity to measure the 
standard and what was the anticipated approach to performance measurement.  
Similar to our findings on oral health, we found extreme variations in state approaches 
to monitoring plan compliance with the pediatric lead screening standards of the 
contract, although the majority of state programs expected participating plans to provide 
some evidence of improvement in their performance (Table 2 in Appendix II).  In 
addition, about half of the states that were more advanced in their monitoring efforts 
had also developed a closer collaboration with the public health agency in this area.  At 
the opposite end of the spectrum, the two states that did not monitor compliance at all 
deferred all monitoring duties and responsibilities to the public health agency, which 
was seen as being the lead monitoring agency in this area.  
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3.  Summary of Findings on Selection of Standards 
 
Overall, our findings show that states with Medicaid and separate SCHIP 
programs faced different choices because of differing applicable federal law.  For both 
dental and lead screening services, states with Medicaid programs and SCHIP Medicaid 
expansion programs or separate SCHIP programs administered by the Medicaid agency 
(hereafter, Medicaid states) followed the EPSDT requirements to set their standards, 
though, in the case of oral health, Medicaid states had a level of discretion in setting 
their standards not available for lead screening.  In contrast, states with separate SCHIP 
programs had much greater flexibility in both areas.   
 
The EPSDT standards on oral health essentially leave it up to states to select the 
periodicity schedule plans and providers must follow in the provision of oral health 
services, although they require states to consult with recognized medical and dental 
organizations involved in children’s health care, which have not yet reached a 
consensus on what the standard of care should be.  Despite this lack of consensus in 
the field, the majority of Medicaid states selected the AAP recommendations for 
preventive pediatric health care (i.e., screen and refer at age 3)74 and believed that their 
choice reflected existing practice and thus did not exceed industry customs and norms 
in health care quality for children. Similarly, the majority of separate SCHIP plans chose 
to require participating health plans to follow the AAP standards on dental referrals.  In 
at least two instances, states augmented the AAP guidelines with additional requirements 
on health plans, providers, or both and believed their choice went a step further than 
existing practice and thus attempted to raise the bar in health care quality for children.   
 
The EPSDT standards on lead screening do not give states much flexibility in 
setting their own standards.  In addition, they already represent an advance beyond 
existing professional and industry norms.  As a result, the majority of Medicaid states 
incorporated the EPSDT standards into their own standards and believed that they went 
beyond existing norms.  However, in what is perhaps indicative of what is to come as 
CDC and CMS are contemplating a possible change in lead screening policy, one 
Medicaid state, noting the current disagreement among CMS regional offices on the 
benefits of universal testing due to the very low prevalence of childhood lead poisoning 
in certain areas of the country, opted for a policy of targeted screening (which is 
reflected in the contract by a reference to current preventive guidelines), similar to that 
advocated by the industry, against current Medicaid policy, but with the understanding 
of its regional office.  In contrast to the majority of Medicaid states but in step with the 
Medicaid state just described, all separate SCHIP programs selected the AAP standards 
on well-baby and well-child visits as a way to tie in lead screening services without 
having to explicitly mention them. 
 
Taken together, these findings suggest that, unless the federal government 
specifies the content of coverage and the periodicity with which it should be furnished, 
states will be more likely to follow professional and industry practice and forego 
attempts to raise the bar in health care quality for children.  They further suggest that the 
federal government will be more likely to specify the content of coverage and the 
periodicity with which it should be furnished in the case of low prevalence conditions 
                                       
74 See previous footnote about the change in AAP policy. 
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that are attached to public health concerns.  If those federal specifications reflect an 
advance beyond current norms, as one can expect in the case of low prevalence 
conditions, states may run into serious implementation problems.   
 
Our interviews indicate that it may be the case with childhood lead poisoning.  
Several states described a situation where plans and providers are uniformly opposed to 
universal screening and instead, favor targeted screening.  In some states, the very low 
prevalence of the condition further reinforces the perception among medical directors 
and pediatricians that universal screening is a waste of resources.  Except for one state, 
which decided against compliance with federal policy so that it could redirect its limited 
resources to addressing more pressing needs, states find themselves in a bind in trying 
to meet federal requirements. They either deal directly with provider resistance, as 
several states have done, investing resources in educating providers about the 
importance of universal screening (when changing provider behavior is known to be an 
extremely difficult task and when these resources could be put to other uses), or they 
do not do so directly but rather indirectly, relying solely on their monitoring and 
enforcement plan as a means to redress pervasive provider noncompliance (with the 
limitations of such an approach in addressing the root causes of the problem).   
b.  The Implementation of Medicaid and SCHIP Managed Care Monitoring and 
 Enforcement  Activities 
In this section, we describe and compare state approaches to monitoring and 
enforcement of pediatric standards, by degree of managed care penetration (i.e., high 
vs. medium vs. low penetration), type of program design (i.e., Medicaid-administered 
program vs. separately-administered SCHIP plan), and prevalence of the condition 
targeted by the contractual performance standard (i.e., high vs. low prevalence 
condition).    
 
1.  State Approaches to Monitoring and Enforcement of Pediatric Standards by Degree 
of Managed Care  Penetration 
The nine participating states were categorized according to the level of managed 
care penetration in the general population.  They were then divided into the following 
three groups for the purpose of analyzing interview responses: (1) states with high levels 
of managed care penetration, i.e., states with more than 20 percent of the general 
population enrolled in managed care (seven states); (2) states with medium levels of 
managed care penetration, i.e., states with 10 to 19.9 percent of the general population 
enrolled in managed care (one state); and (3) states with low levels of managed care 
penetration, i.e. states with less than 10 percent of the general population enrolled in 
managed care (one state).   Because of the small sample size, our findings have to be 
interpreted with extreme caution.  Nevertheless, we found that the level of MCO 
participation and competition in the state in general and in the Medicaid and SCHIP 
markets in particular appeared to matter.  In the state with only one contractor, officials 
felt that pushing it too hard on compliance would result in the MCO pulling out.  Table 
3 in Appendix II describes each grouping in more detail, including the level of Medicaid 
and SCHIP managed care enrollment in the study states. 
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• Formal monitoring and enforcement plan with clear goals, assignments, 
measurements, and milestones 
Under Medicaid, states are required to ensure that managed care organizations 
comply with federally-specified EPSDT and managed care requirements and standards 
established by the state in the area of quality assessment and performance improvement 
through regular monitoring and evaluation of their contract provisions, which by law 
they must establish when they buy managed care products.  Under SCHIP, states that 
buy managed care products must also do so through contracts that adhere to federal 
and state contract and procurement requirements but they are not bound by similar 
requirements regarding coverage of benefits, managed care, and oversight of the quality 
of care furnished (although the option to follow Medicaid requirements is available).   
In order to assess states’ monitoring efforts, we asked whether they had a formal, 
written monitoring and enforcement plan for the provision of pediatric standards spelled 
out in their contracts, and if so, what its main goals were.  We also asked them whether 
they had clearly stated their policy objectives regarding the monitoring and enforcement 
of the pediatric oral health and blood lead level screening standards included in their 
contracts, whether they had set up an agency responsible for implementing and 
enforcing these policy objectives, and whether there was multi-faceted support within 
the agency and among policy beneficiaries toward these objectives. 
All states had a formal, written general monitoring and enforcement plan.  All 
states responded that they had folded their general monitoring and enforcement plan 
into their contract, and that its general goal was to ensure access to quality care.  Five 
states referenced federal Medicaid policy and state statutes, regulations, and policy 
manuals as additional documents embodying their monitoring and enforcement plan.  
Four states had also developed a separate, comprehensive quality improvement plan 
independent of the contract, and, of those, two had developed a dental quality 
improvement plan in addition to their comprehensive quality improvement plan.  State 
officials explained that specific policy objectives regarding oral health and lead 
screening could be found in the same documents.  The majority of respondents stated 
that they expected oral health services to be provided in accordance with the EPSDT 
requirements and AAP recommendations, and lead screening services in accordance 
with the EPSDT requirements and state laws.  They also believed that they had clearly 
communicated these expectations, both orally and in writing. 
Low levels of managed care penetration seemed to be a factor in explaining 
whether states had specified precise standards for measuring compliance with 
quality improvement goals in the areas of dental care and lead screening.  While the 
degree of managed care penetration did not seem to be a factor in explaining whether 
states had a formal, written monitoring plan, it appeared to have some bearing on the 
extent to which states had specified precise standards for measuring compliance with 
their policy goals related to oral health and lead screening.  In contrast to states with 
high and medium levels of managed care penetration, the majority of which had 
established clinical performance measures specific to well-child care (oftentimes 
replicating the federal requirement of a participation of 80 percent in the EPSDT visit), 
and in several cases specific to dental care and lead screening services, the one state 
with low levels of managed care penetration had not established any clinical 
performance measures.  Because there is so little managed care in that state, program 
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officials explained, the program does not focus on quality improvement but on ensuring 
access to care instead.  To that end, the program uses a quantifiable access standard, 
whereby plans must demonstrate that 90 percent of their enrolled children have access 
to a pediatrician within 10 miles.  Although unique in the group of states studied, this 
state exemplifies the need for an underlying managed care market if states want to be 
successful in using managed care and quality improvement techniques in their public 
insurance programs. 
All states had set up an agency for implementing and enforcing the policy 
objectives related to oral health and lead screening.  Although all states had set up an 
agency for implementing and enforcing the policy objectives related to oral health and 
lead screening, in some states the responsibilities specifically linked to the oversight of 
managed care, dental carve-outs, and lead screening seemed to add layers of 
complexity to state program administration.  It is not known whether states had plans 
outlining the lead agency’s monitoring activities, key partners and stakeholders, and 
roles and responsibilities, but we found that states adopted differing approaches to 
program organization when setting up an agency for implementing and enforcing the 
policy objectives related to oral health and lead screening.  Six states made the Medicaid 
agency the lead agency for setting contractual standards and the Medicaid managed 
care division the lead division for monitoring compliance with those standards.  Two of 
those states also had a dental carve-out (one run under a fee-for-service system and the 
other under a managed care system) and had assigned oversight responsibilities 
specifically related to the provision of dental services to a division specializing in dental 
care (although the Medicaid managed care division retained oversight responsibility for 
the dental component of the EPSDT well-child visit).  These two states also shared with 
the department of health or even had relinquished to the department of health 
significant oversight responsibility for lead screening services.   
The seventh state integrated all Medicaid and SCHIP operations into one 
overarching agency and made that agency the lead oversight agency.  The eighth state 
combined the Medicaid agency, the SCHIP agency, and the public health agency into 
one department.  In the case of Medicaid, oversight over oral health and lead screening 
contractual duties were assigned to the Medicaid agency, and community awareness 
duties regarding lead screening to the public health agency.  In the case of SCHIP, 
oversight duties were shared between the SCHIP agency (oral health) and the public 
health agency (lead screening).   
The last two states, which happen to be separate SCHIP states, one located in a 
heavy managed care market and the other in an almost nonexistent managed care 
market, have their programs jointly administered by an independent health insurance 
board, which is responsible for setting standards for the program, and another entity.  In 
the first state, this entity was the department of managed care, which was responsible 
for regulating all aspects of managed care operations and being the enforcer of state 
law.  In the second state, the entity was the Medicaid agency, which was responsible for 
reporting and overall management of the program. 
The level of support for the policy objectives regarding the monitoring and 
enforcement of oral health and lead screening varied across states, and the low 
degree of managed care penetration appeared to be a factor in one state.  Three 
state programs enjoyed multi-faceted support toward their objectives on oral health and 
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lead screening.  Personnel responsible for implementing the policy were committed to 
promoting the objectives, and they enjoyed the support of their superiors in doing so.  
Health plans cohesively supported implementation of the policy.  In two additional state 
programs, interviewees described a general commitment from all sides to implementing 
important policies, particularly as they related to lead in the first state and to oral health 
in the second state, even though health plans appeared to raise issues around the lack 
of adequate resources for them to reach the stated objectives.   
State and plan commitment to lead and oral health policy objectives seemed to 
rest heavily on a belief in the utility of such efforts.  In one state, while the 
administration remained committed to promoting oral health and lead screening 
objectives, health plans and providers, while supportive of the oral health objectives, 
objected to the lead screening objectives because of the controversial issue of universal 
testing.  In another state, while the administration was highly aware of the lead 
screening objectives but not very conscious of the oral health objectives, health plans 
and providers uniformly rejected the lead screening objectives and did not even focus 
on the oral health objectives.   
In the one state with low levels of managed care penetration, program 
representatives explained that, while the state administration and the health plan were 
committed to promoting the oral health and lead screening goals, the health plan’s loose 
managed care structure was not conducive to cohesiveness on the part of the providers 
and this lack of control over providers prevented the health plan from implementing 
strategies to reach those goals.   
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• Prevention Strategies 
 
In our effort to assess the effectiveness of states’ monitoring efforts, we also 
examined state strategies to prevent implementation problems, with a special emphasis 
on states’ contract specifications in the following areas:  
 
• service components and service periodicity schedule;  
• adequacy of provider network, travel distances, and waiting times to provide the 
service according to the periodicity schedule;  
• adequacy of medical care provided through the use of service specific utilization 
statistics, encounter data, clinical studies, and medical record audits; and  
• adequacy of beneficiary satisfaction through the use of service specific 
satisfaction surveys and grievance reports.   
 
We found that contractual specifications varied greatly across study states, a 
variation that did not seem related to the degree of managed care penetration in the 
state. 
 
Specification of service components and periodicity schedule for dental care 
and lead screening services.  State programs more often listed the service components 
of dental care and used the state’s own periodicity schedule or referred to some 
professional organization’s periodicity schedule for the provision of dental care.  In 
contrast, they more often included a broad requirement to provide EPSDT or laboratory 
tests, or omitted altogether a requirement to provide lead screening services, and 
followed the EPSDT schedule or lacked specificity regarding the periodicity schedule for 
the provision of lead screening services. 
 
Specification of minimum provider network requirements, waiting times, 
and travel distances.  In general, state programs were more likely to omit specifications 
on one, two, or all three aspects of access to care (provider networks, waiting times, and 
travel distances) than to include provisions on all three aspects of access to care.  Four 
state programs, including the separate SCHIP programs, lacked specificity on all three 
aspects of access to care; three programs lacked specificity on two of three aspects; and 
two programs lacked specificity on one of three.  Only two state programs had 
specifications on all three aspects of access to care.  In the area of dental care, they 
were as likely to specify minimums that were specific to the provision of dental services 
(e.g., network must include dentists who should be located within the specified travel 
distances and should see patients within the specified waiting times) as they were to 
specify general requirements for the adequacy of the provider network, waiting times 
and travel distances.  In the area of lead screening services, on the other hand, they 
were much less likely to tailor their minimum requirements to the provision of lead 
screening services and more likely to impose general minima. 
 
Specification of data requirements to monitor adequacy of medical care and 
beneficiary satisfaction.  All but one state program included some data reporting 
requirements in their contracts.  Only two state programs required managed care 
organizations to provide all sources of data, i.e., utilization statistics, encounter data, 
clinical studies, medical record audits, satisfaction surveys, and grievance reports.  The 
remaining states required managed care organizations to provide one or more of these 
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sources of data, but in the aggregate each source of data was required in similar 
frequency.  Additionally, except for two state programs (one contract specifically 
required utilization statistics and encounter data on dental services, while another 
contract specifically required clinical studies on lead screening services), requirements 
were not tailored to dental care and lead screening.   
 
 
• Coordination Strategies 
 A third key component of a state monitoring plan consists of coordination 
among the various agencies responsible for achieving the policy objectives regarding 
oral health and lead screening.  Do the Medicaid and SCHIP agencies and the various 
other agencies responsible for monitoring and enforcement (e.g., Attorney General’s 
office, department of insurance) administratively coordinate their efforts?   How do they 
coordinate their efforts?  Do they share information and communicate on a regular 
basis?  Again, we found great variation in the level of coordination across states, which 
did not appear related to the degree of managed care penetration in the state.  Most 
states pursued strategies to coordinate their monitoring and enforcement efforts with 
other relevant agencies, such as allowing access to data on request (one state), being 
notified and notifying the appropriate agency when appeals indicate a potential problem 
(five states), disseminating or making available the results of internal audits to interested 
parties (four states), referring cases to the appropriate agency if monitoring reports show 
that they fall under some other entity’s jurisdiction (one state), setting up regular 
channels of communication and information sharing, e.g., interagency meetings (one 
state).  
Coordination with the Attorney General’s office.  Generally speaking, state 
programs did not appear to have close relationships with the Attorney General’s office, 
which was perceived as having narrow responsibilities in the area of criminal activity 
(i.e., fraud and abuse) and thus as having little involvement in issues of quality of care, 
especially as it related to dental care and lead screening services.  One state official also 
explained that the program currently lacked funding, staff, and need to pursue 
coordination efforts with the Attorney General’s office.  A few states described a more 
ongoing relationship between the two agencies, and of those, only one state had 
established a formal relationship with the other agency.  Three state programs had no 
formal coordination with the Attorney General’s office but did refer cases of fraud (e.g., 
enrollment fraud) detected through their own monitoring efforts.  In addition, one of 
these programs held annual meetings with the Attorney General’s fraud control unit 
staff, who come to the agency to make presentations to participating health plans.  One 
state program had an interagency agreement with the Attorney General’s office 
pertaining to cases of fraud. 
Coordination with the department of insurance.  Most state programs had 
some relationship with the department of insurance, which was chiefly responsible for 
issues of financial solvency.  Several states described a close working relationship with 
the department.  Working relationships with the department of insurance ranged from 
information sharing and regular communication to standing monthly or quarterly 
meetings to referrals of cases when warranted and permitted under state law.  Other 
states described a more episodic kind of a relationship with the department, with no 
formal process in place.  One state limited contact with the department to those cases 
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where there was a violation of insurance license or financial requirement; another to 
fraud and abuse issues.  A third group of states had no relationship at all with the 
department, although they reported that they cooperated when necessary.  
Coordination with the department of health.  Coordination with the 
department of health was often cited as necessary needed in the area of lead screening 
oversight since it is a public health reportable condition, although there were gradients 
in the level of coordination across states. For example, we found that: 
• one state shares a database on lead screening with the department;  
• one state has a data sharing agreement with the department of health;  
• one state has access to the department’s surveillance data and does its own 
geographic analyses, and in addition, a nurse from the Medicaid managed 
care division is involved in the department’s lead screening group;  
• one state allows the department to access its Medicaid data on request;  
• one state has regular communication and meetings with the department on 
lead screening issues and each agency’s specific area of responsibility;  
• one state has a close relationship with the department on the development of 
lead screening incentives;  
• one state communicates with the public health agency on a regular basis 
through formal and informal meetings, which is facilitated by the fact that the 
two agencies are housed in the same department;  
• one state (separate SCHIP program) is currently discussing future coordination 
efforts with the lead screening branch; and two states (separate SCHIP 
programs) have no formal collaboration with the department (though one 
program does collaborate on immunizations and quality improvement).    
 
Much less often did states pursue coordination efforts with the department of 
health on oral health, with only two states mentioning that they also worked with the 
department on oral health issues (in addition to lead screening issues). Finally, two 
states also interacted with the department through formal and informal mechanisms on 
complaints and grievances. 
Coordination between SCHIP and Medicaid agencies.  All three separate 
SCHIP programs talked about their coordination efforts with the much larger and more 
experienced Medicaid programs.  One state program works closely with Medicaid on 
quality monitoring and enforcement.  The second state program works closely with 
Medicaid generally (“they share information on a regular basis and sit with them daily”) 
and is currently holding regular meetings on encounter data where they are discussing 
the possibility of “piggy-backing” SCHIP’s future data collection efforts on Medicaid 
current efforts.  The third state program said that the two agencies have a close 
relationship and try to set common standards and share information on those. 
 
 
• Detection Strategies 
A fourth key component of a state monitoring plan consists of detection 
strategies or the creation of a mechanism to monitor compliance.  What kind of 
mechanisms did the Medicaid and SCHIP agencies put in place to monitor the provision 
of dental care and lead screening services?  Do they use quantifiable performance 
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standards and what types of information do they collect to verify plan compliance with 
the standards? The degree of managed care penetration did not seem to influence 
whether states had put in place mechanisms for monitoring compliance but, as stated 
previously, it seemed to influence whether states used quality performance indicators to 
measure compliance. 
All states had created a mechanism for monitoring compliance, which was 
not specific to monitoring the provision of dental care and lead screening services 
but rather was applicable to the monitoring of plan performance in general.  All 
states relied heavily on data collected at regular intervals (monthly, quarterly, annually) 
as a mechanism to monitor compliance.  Specific sources of data included: comparative 
data analyses (e.g., EPSDT reports, HEDIS measures); routine reviews of specific 
problem areas (e.g., EPSDT, lead, dental, provider network); periodic site visits (e.g., 
operational and financial reviews, which can include a review of lead screening and 
dental care services); focused clinical studies/medical audits/medical record reviews 
(e.g., provision of dental, lead screening services); annual performance reviews/internal 
audits of performance; review of plan policies and procedures; regulatory reviews; 
review of plan-conducted quality improvement projects (e.g., dental care); satisfaction 
surveys; and use of oral feedback.  One state also mentioned the department of health’s 
lead screening data warehouse as an important source of data for monitoring plan 
compliance with lead screening requirements.   
In addition, states usually relied on grievances and complaint calls as a source of 
data for monitoring compliance and also used them as an early warning system for 
detecting potential problems of substandard performance requiring follow-up on the 
part of the state.  However, states explained, grievances and complaint calls rarely deal 
with denial of services, or if they do, they do not deal with preventive care services, 
such as oral health and lead screening, but rather with specialty care services.   
Except for one state with a separate SCHIP program, where all of the analyses 
and investigations were plan-conducted, analyses of the various sources of data just 
described were performed by the state and/or an external organization and the plans, 
more often with than without outside validation. 
As stated above, the degree of managed care penetration seemed to have 
some effect on the extent to which states had specified quantifiable quality 
standards for measuring compliance with their policy goals related to oral health 
and lead screening.  In contrast to states with high and medium levels of managed care 
penetration, the majority of which had established clinical performance measures 
specific to well-child care (oftentimes replicating the federal requirement of a 
participation of 80 percent of enrolled children in the EPSDT visit), and in several cases 
specific to dental care and lead screening services, the one state with low levels of 
managed care penetration had not established any clinical performance measures.  
Because there is so little managed care in that state, program officials explained, the 
program does not focus on quality improvement but on ensuring access to care instead.  
To that end, the program uses a quantifiable access standard, instead of quality 
performance indicators.   
 
 
• Enforcement Strategies 
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The fifth key component to a state monitoring plan consists of enforcement 
strategies.  What is the state’s general approach to enforcement?  What kinds of penalty 
and incentive systems favor compliance?  Are there any barriers in enforcing contract 
provisions related to lead screening and oral health? 
All states characterized their general approach to enforcement as ongoing.  
The majority of states also characterized their general approach to enforcement as 
proactive and systematic in addition to ongoing.  A few states added that in some 
aspects it is also reactive and periodic, citing complaints and grievances as a monitoring 
mechanism to which they react whenever providers and beneficiaries use it. 
While several states with high levels of managed care penetration were 
uncomfortable with the term “enforcement,” which invoked punishment, and 
preferred the terms “common quality improvement effort with plans,” 
collaboration with plans, or partnership with plans, states with medium and low 
levels of managed care penetration related a real need to minimize their 
enforcement efforts if they wanted to keep plans in their programs.   Even though 
monitoring and enforcement takes on a more collaborative tone in states with higher 
levels of managed care penetration because of external factors such as major access 
problems (e.g., undersupply of pediatric dentists), this was particularly true for states 
with lower levels of managed care penetration.  In the state with medium levels of 
managed care penetration, the program witnessed a significant drop in the number of 
contracts signed with managed care organizations over a ten year period.  Program 
officials attributed this drop to underlying systemic factors, such as provider shortages 
and low Medicaid reimbursement rates, which make it difficult for plans to attract 
providers willing to serve publicly-insured children.  Under these circumstances, 
program representatives explained, it is difficult to “come down on HMOs,” even though 
the contractual mechanisms exist to sanction them.  These circumstances also 
encouraged the state to focus limited resources on “getting kids in” for care rather than 
“doing detailed analysis.”  Program officials use the rate of EPSDT well-child visits as a 
starting point to determine whether children receive dental services and they do not 
enforce the lead component of EPSDT not only because they feel that they would 
duplicate the extensive work of the department of health in this area and thus waste 
precious resources but also because they feel that they would not be the appropriate 
oversight agency in view of the department of health’s jurisdiction over the entire state 
population.   
State officials in the state with low levels of managed care penetration explained 
that, because there is so little managed care in general, there is also little enforcement 
other than in the case of criminal acts (e.g., fraud and abuse) or complaints.  They 
stressed that they would lose their sole contractor if they started strict enforcement of 
plan performance.  Instead, they work very closely with the contractor in order to retain 
its services. 
The majority of states had specified sanctions in their contracts, and several 
states devised a graduated incentive and penalty system to encourage plan 
compliance but the actual use of sanctions varied across states.  All but two state 
programs specified sanctions for plan noncompliance in their contracts, and in many 
cases also specified the basis for imposing each type of sanction.  The number of 
contractually specified sanctions went from a low of one (i.e., termination, the ultimate 
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sanction) to a high of nine sanctions specified.  Only four state programs tied sanctions 
to quality violations: liquidated damages in one state; corrective action plans in two 
states (one of which also tied sanctions to nonperformance on EPSDT, lead screening, 
and oral health services and termination to quality violations); and withholding of 
capitation in the fourth state.   
At least five states developed a graduated incentive and penalty system.  In all 
cases, states began with a corrective action plan, which is often, but not only, used to 
address quality violations, and then advanced to sanctions, when plans demonstrate 
sustained nonperformance.  For example, in one state, sanctions start with the 
suspension of enrollment, followed by financial penalties, and end with termination.  In 
another state, sanctions start with refundable fines, followed by nonrefundable fines, 
then by enrollment freezes, and end with termination.   
States that have had to advance from corrective action plans to sanctions have 
found that this progression is the most effective way to ensure compliance.  Overall, 
they have also found that the use of financial incentives rather than financial penalties 
works best.  As one state official put it, “the carrot works as well as the stick, if not 
better.”  For example, one state gives plans additional dollars for each additional lead 
screen or uses withholds to encourage plans to meet the lead screening standards.  
Another state is currently considering using the HEDIS scores to determine default 
enrollment algorithms as an incentive to improve quality.  Several states underscored 
that nonfinancial incentives, such as information sharing on the web and public 
reporting of unblinded information across plans, were also quite effective.   
The actual use of incentives and penalties varied across states.  Of those states 
with a graduated system, the majority did not have to go beyond the corrective action 
plan.  However, at least two states have used the sanctions available to them beyond the 
corrective action plan, and one state used all of them but termination (although it did 
recommend it in one instance).  Three states stated they never had to use sanctions, 
including the one state with medium levels of managed care penetration.  This particular 
state explained it is difficult to sanction plans for systemic factors that are beyond the 
plans’ control (as the state official put it, “it is hard to enforce the contract when there is 
nobody to do the service”). 
The majority of states did not report any barriers in enforcing the language 
of their contracts, although they did report significant challenges in both the area 
of oral health and lead screening related to the underlying health care system.  
States reported barriers and challenges not so much related to the language used in their 
contracts, though in two instances it did come up as an issue, but rather related to 
underlying systemic issues.  As one state official put it, while there was an impetus for 
improving the contractual language on well-child care, especially lead screening, the 
contract was not seen as all encompassing on quality improvement because other work 
at the community level ultimately made a difference.  The state official also noted that 
Medicaid, despite its reliance on contracts and payments, is not as effective as 
community standards to change medical practice.  Or, as another state official put it, 
“we codify what we would like to see happen but have to deal with the reality of the 
delivery system.”   
 
Special challenges related to the provision of dental services included:  
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• access problems in rural areas;  
• manpower and supply issues, such as the lack of dentists in general and the 
lack of dentists accepting Medicaid patients;  
• low reimbursement rates;  
• lack of awareness on the importance of oral health both among providers 
and beneficiaries (which prompted one state to increase attention to the issue 
by sending reminders to providers to do oral screens and stuffers to 
beneficiaries reminding them about the services to which they are entitled);  
• the current practice of providers to bill for EPSDT in general, not specific oral 
components, which makes monitoring of dental care difficult, especially with 
encounter data;  
• disagreement among professional organizations on the appropriate periodicity 
schedule; and 
• lack of training (which prompted one state to develop a training program on 
pediatric dental care for both dentists and physicians, who are trained by 
dentists). 
 
Special challenges related to the provision of lead screening services 
included:  
• resistance to universal testing reinforced by the low prevalence of childhood 
lead poisoning and the perception that is it wrong to invest in this;  
• poor reporting, poor data, lack of uniform measurement, lack of national 
protocols for collecting consistent information across plans and measuring 
performance across plans;  
• lack of provider education (e.g., physicians do not do blood work in their 
offices, are not aware of other less common sources of exposure, are 
unaware of the differences between Medicaid policy and AAP 
recommendations); and 
• reimbursement issues, including low provider reimbursement rates, unfunded 
mandates imposed on plans, reimbursement only for venipuncture not for 
capillary specimens. 
 
 
• Reporting strategies 
The sixth and final component of a state monitoring plan consists of reporting 
strategies to the federal government, which is a key actor in the implementation of 
Medicaid and SCHIP policy due to the federalist nature of the two programs. 
The majority of states described an ongoing relationship with the federal 
government but the degree of involvement on the part of the federal government 
varied by state.   Two states said the federal government was very involved in their 
programs in general.  A third state stated that the federal government had an acute 
interest in its EPSDT program, especially in the area of lead screening.  A fourth state 
described the federal government as an active purchaser articulating policy, not so 
much an active participant at the state level on behalf of children protected by Medicaid 
and SCHIP policy.   
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One separate SCHIP program described the federal government more as a silent 
partner, explaining that the well-child visit regulations were the only active involvement 
on the part of the federal government.  In contrast, another separate SCHIP program 
said that the federal government was highly involved, at least in the beginning of the 
program, by exercising oversight over dental care because manpower and the ability to 
meet the needs of SCHIP children were significant issues for the state. 
Although states can report back to the CMS and the Office of Inspector 
General for additional sanctions beyond the purview of the state, none had used 
this option.  At least one state program explained that the contract reiterates some 
federal requirements that give CMS or the Office of Inspector General authority to 
impose sanctions, for example in the case of violations of the Civil Rights Act, and 
debarment of providers.  However, states uniformly said they never had to use this 
option. 
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2.  State Approaches to Monitoring and Enforcement of Pediatric Standards by Type of 
Program Design  
 
As part of our study, we reviewed our discussions with state Medicaid and SCHIP 
agency representatives for differences and similarities in their approach to monitoring 
and enforcing their managed care contracts, particularly as it pertains to oral health and 
lead screening.  We categorized our nine states according to program design and 
divided them into the following three groups for the purpose of analyzing interview 
responses: (1) states with Medicaid programs and SCHIP Medicaid expansion programs 
(two states); (2) states with Medicaid programs and separate SCHIP programs which use 
the same contractual document for both programs (four states); and (3) states with 
Medicaid programs and separate SCHIP programs which use separate contractual 
documents for each program (three states).  Table 4 in Appendix II describes the federal 
requirements that apply to each grouping in more detail.  Because officials representing 
states in the second group of states affirmed that SCHIP children were entitled to the 
same services as Medicaid children and managed care organizations were held to the 
same data collection and reporting obligations for both populations, we refer to the first 
and second group of states jointly as Medicaid states, unless specifically noted 
otherwise in this section. 
 
SCHIP agencies’ monitoring and enforcement plans tend to focus more on 
oral health than lead screening, whereas Medicaid agencies’ plans focus more on 
lead screening than oral health.  The differences in approaches to adopting, 
monitoring, and enforcing contractual provisions vis-à-vis lead screening and oral health 
are rooted chiefly within the respective federal and state laws and regulations that 
control the duties of the Medicaid and SCHIP agencies when contracting with managed 
care organizations.   
 
Medicaid agencies operate within a more tightly regulated structure than their 
SCHIP counterparts.  For instance, dental and lead screening services are federally 
required under EPSDT, and Medicaid programs must monitor the provision of these 
services.  In addition, Medicaid law spells out a periodicity schedule for lead screening 
services in much more detail than it does for dental care services. SCHIP programs, on 
the other hand, have more flexibility in terms of the benefits they must provide and their 
responsibilities in measuring plan performance.  Federal law only requires SCHIP 
programs to provide well-baby and well-child care services, and does not specifically 
list dental care and lead screening as a component of either.  In neither case does it 
spell out a periodicity schedule.  In addition, it does not impose any monitoring 
requirements similar to Medicaid. 
 
For those states interviewed, all Medicaid and SCHIP contracts include or 
reference a formal, written plan for monitoring and enforcing the provision of pediatric 
services by managed care organizations.  Most Medicaid contracts referred managed 
care organizations to pertinent policy guides, administrative rules and federal and state 
laws and regulations.  A few Medicaid programs and one SCHIP program included a 
more detailed roadmap for monitoring plans in additional materials referenced by the 
contract, such as a quality improvement plan and provider manuals, which functioned 
as guidelines for monitoring the lead and dental provisions outlined in the contract.  
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The degree of specificity of contractual provisions for lead screening and 
dental care varied by contract, with no noticeable difference between Medicaid and 
SCHIP contracts other than references to EPSDT in Medicaid contracts which did 
not appear in SCHIP contracts. Medicaid agencies relied on EPSDT services to ensure 
the provision of lead screening and testing to their beneficiaries.  In many cases, 
contracts simply referred to federal and state EPSDT standards.  In contrast, Medicaid 
agencies were a little more specific in their contracts on the service components of oral 
health and the intervals with which they should be provided under EPSDT.  Though 
physicians were required to perform an oral screen, most contracts did not more 
specifically denote what this screen should include.  One Medicaid state “beefed up” 
such language by requiring doctors to “look at teeth” and also instituted training 
programs aimed at educating physicians and dentists in pediatric dental care.  A second 
Medicaid program added requirements to ensure open access to dental care and had 
begun a statewide effort to educate families on their rights to seek such care.   
 
Because there are no EPSDT-like mandates contained in federal law for the 
provision of well-child care services under SCHIP and because, one state official said, 
SCHIP children “look” more like private sector children and less like Medicaid children, 
health plan obligations regarding lead and dental services are less circumscribed in 
SCHIP contracts.  SCHIP contract provisions were more specific regarding expectations 
for oral health but noticeably broader on the issue of lead screening.  All three contracts 
listed specific service components of dental care whereas, for lead, two contracts 
included a broad requirement to provide laboratory tests and one contract omitted a 
requirement altogether.  All three contracts required plans to follow the AAP guidelines 
for laboratory tests (two contracts) and oral health (one contract); one contract referred 
to the AAPD guidelines for oral health; and two contracts lacked specificity regarding 
the periodicity schedule for lead screening (one contract) and oral health (one contract).   
 
There was not a significant difference between SCHIP and Medicaid in terms 
of interagency coordination with the state Attorney General’s office and the 
department of insurance, but some differences were detected in their relationship 
with the department of health, particularly in the area of lead screening.  
Responsibilities and duties of the respective agencies seemed to be well laid out 
because the Attorney General’s office and the department of insurance have very 
specific oversight authority over  public health insurance programs on matters of fraud 
and abuse, and financial and other regulation, respectively.  All agencies also had some 
type of process in place by which matters of concern were referred to the appropriate 
party.   
 
Almost all of the Medicaid programs relied on some degree of coordination and 
communication with the department of health in regards to blood lead levels and high 
prevalence areas as well as lead abatement due to the department’s surveillance 
activities in the area of childhood lead poisoning.  Many of the Medicaid agency 
representatives expressed opposition to what they perceived as overly strict lead 
screening requirements imposed by the federal government.  Many states felt that lead 
screening efforts were too broad and financially wasteful, and that more targeted 
screening efforts would be a more efficient use of limited funds. 
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In contrast, none of the SCHIP programs had a formal collaboration mechanism 
in place with the department of health, although one program had started discussions 
about future coordination efforts.  One SCHIP representative noted that the SCHIP 
agency considered the issue more under the purview of department of health, and that 
when, issues of follow-up on high lead screening levels was necessary, the department 
of health worked directly with the state’s only insurer and not with the SCHIP agency.  
SCHIP agencies also reported that they worked closely with their Medicaid counterparts. 
 
Typically, an agency’s ability to monitor the execution of contractual 
obligations relied heavily on data, but Medicaid agencies were generally more 
advanced than SCHIP agencies in this area due to differences in federal 
requirements and in program longevity.  Medicaid agencies are legally required to 
collect certain types of data about their beneficiaries enrolled in managed care, 
including encounter and performance data, and data used evaluate the quality of 
services provided as well as beneficiary access to care.  Managed care organizations 
participating in Medicaid programs are obligated to collect this data and report them to 
the state Medicaid agency as specified in their contracts.  All Medicaid states and states 
using Medicaid contracts for both their SCHIP and Medicaid populations collected 
federally mandated encounter data and EPSDT data (Form 416). Several Medicaid 
program representatives noted that, although physicians are obligated to perform EPSDT 
services during well-child visits, it is difficult to unbundle EPSDT data to determine 
performance levels for oral health screens because they do not bill for those services 
separately.  Additional sources of data, such as federally-required focused clinical 
studies, annual site visits, and other reports (e.g., complaints and grievances) helped 
agencies monitor health plan performance in regards to lead screening and oral health. 
 
SCHIP programs, on the other hand, are not required to collect encounter data 
nor are they bound by EPSDT reporting requirements.  In general, their contractual 
requirements and data collection techniques were not as evolved as their Medicaid 
counterparts.  Most lacked dependable if any encounter data.  State efforts to measure 
services provided to their SCHIP population tended to be more exploratory at this point, 
with the agencies struggling to find ways to measure and improve plan quality and 
performance, particularly for oral health, among other health issues.  One agency 
representative noted that because their SCHIP program is relatively new, they were still 
in the process of “getting to know” the SCHIP population before determining contractual 
data reporting requirements.  Another SCHIP agency reported that they relied on HEDIS 
reports and satisfaction surveys to monitor plans as they did not have the budget to 
include encounter data.  Two states had not yet developed quantifiable standards for 
measuring oral health and lead screening quality; one of these relied solely on an 
access standard, which detects if children have access to a pediatrician.  The third 
agency had developed a dental performance standard but not a lead performance 
standard.  It had not yet developed a performance threshold for the dental standard, but 
had begun collecting data in order to “see what was happening out there.”   
 
Many Medicaid and SCHIP agencies also used HEDIS performance standards to 
monitor and enforce contract provisions and quality standards.  HEDIS is limited, 
however, in that, while the National Medicaid HEDIS Database Project provides 
standardized performance information for managed Medicaid health plans to assist 
them in their evaluation of the quality of care provided to beneficiaries, including a 
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category for “annual dental visits,” there are no formal national protocols in place for 
collecting information across plans specific to lead screening or testing.  A few Medicaid 
states were piloting a HEDIS-like measure for lead screening.   
 
SCHIP and Medicaid agencies did not exhibit significant differences in their 
enforcement strategies.  The majority of those interviewed viewed the state’s general 
approach to monitoring and enforcement of contractual obligations as ongoing, 
proactive, and systematic, as well as reactive at times.  Penalties and incentives were 
documented in the contracts and states believed that they had the appropriate tools to 
enforce their contracts.  The crosscutting concern expressed by all interviewees was the 
need to provide and monitor services under increasingly tight budgets.  As federal and 
state budgets continue to shrink, states are faced with myriad challenges on how best to 
provide necessary services without financially overextending themselves.  One 
interviewee from a low reimbursement state noted that budgetary constraints in some 
ways compelled states to try to form more cooperative relationships with managed care 
organizations.  Other factors, such as the scarcity of health plans willing to serve 
Medicaid and SCHIP populations, the lack of dentists, and other underlying systemic 
problems, encouraged both Medicaid and SCHIP agencies to form patterns of two-way 
interaction and cooperation with participating plans, rather than top-down or heavy 
handed approaches.   
 
Although contractual language generally gave agencies the ability to penalize, 
financially or otherwise, managed care organizations that did not meet certain 
performance, quality, or other contractual standards, the majority of states expressed 
reticence in using these measures, generally preferring the carrot to the stick.  None of 
the three SCHIP programs had ever used the sanctions available to them, mostly 
because of the newness of the programs.  But other reasons were invoked as well, such 
as the upfront selection process of plans as a guarantee for plans to be good business 
partners in one state, and the low level of managed care penetration in another state. 
 
The direct involvement of the federal government varied across states, but 
several Medicaid agencies perceived the federal government as more involved in 
oversight than SCHIP agencies did.  Several Medicaid and combination program 
interviewees viewed the federal government’s role in lead screening and oral health as 
setting the standards by which the agencies designed their programs.  The federal 
government, they noted, was particularly active in the area of lead screening oversight.  
SCHIP agencies, on the other hand, were given a lot more latitude in designing 
programs.  One agency viewed the federal government more as a silent partner rather 
than an active participant; another agency noted that the federal government had been 
very involved, at least in the beginning of the program, in the area of oral health.  This 
difference in federal involvement is most likely an inherent function of SCHIP program 
design and its size compared to Medicaid. 
 
 
3.  State Approaches to Monitoring and Enforcement of Pediatric Standards by 
Prevalence of the Condition  Targeted by the Contractual Performance Standard  
The assumption driving much of this research was that states would design more 
elaborate monitoring and enforcement plans of pediatric standards relating to low 
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prevalence conditions, presumably because these standards represent a level of care 
that goes beyond what contractors would already furnish as a matter of industry 
practice and, as such, require greater specificity in the contract language.  Our 
assumption did not hold in the case of the nine study states and oral health and lead 
screening services; other important factors, such as program requirements and 
prevalence of the condition in the state, appeared to dictate states’ approaches to 
monitoring the standards.   
Contract specifications were not more detailed for lead screening services 
than for dental care services. In fact, our review of contract requirements indicates 
that contracts were more likely to be vague or silent on the components of lead 
screening services and the periodicity with which they should be furnished, less likely to 
tailor minimum provider network requirements, waiting times, and travel distances to the 
provision of lead screening services, and as likely to require data specific to lead 
screening services (which, in both cases, was a rare occurrence).  
The majority of state programs did not design more elaborate monitoring 
and enforcement approaches for lead screening services than for dental care 
services.  Rather, they either adopted approaches that focused more on the monitoring 
of dental care than lead screening or adopted the same monitoring approach for both 
types of services.   
The first group of programs (four state programs) had more elaborate plans for 
monitoring the provision of dental care than lead screening.  For example, one state 
program uses one performance measure specific to dental care (i.e., annual dental visit) 
with three levels of performance (i.e., minimums, goals, benchmarks).  In contrast, that 
same state uses the federal participation goal for the EPSDT well-child visit without 
tailoring it to lead screening services.  For this program, setting specific lead screening 
performance measures is less of a focus because of the very low prevalence of 
childhood lead poisoning in the state.  Another state program uses performance 
measures specific to dental care, though with no performance minimums yet, but does 
not use any performance measures specific to lead screening.  In this case, the program 
expects to set benchmarks for dental care at a later date once it knows “what is 
happening out there” and has an interest in developing measures specific to lead 
screening but it is currently less of a focus than dental care, partly because the program 
is seen as emulating the commercial market, where issues surrounding lead are not a 
priority.  The last two programs are less advanced in their monitoring of dental services 
but nevertheless are more involved in monitoring dental services than they are in 
monitoring lead screening services.  Indeed, neither program enforces the lead 
component of well-child services because both see monitoring and enforcement of lead 
screening as the responsibility of the department of health.  In addition, one program 
underscored the low prevalence of childhood lead poisoning in the state and the other 
program the lack of federal requirements in this area as additional justifications for their 
lack of enforcement of lead standards.  
The second group of programs (two state programs) had adopted the same 
monitoring approach for the provision of both dental care and lead screening.  One 
program has performance measures specific to dental care and lead screening services, 
with performance minimums and goals, although it currently looks for an annual 
percentage increase in performance compared to the previous year.  The other program 
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does not focus on quality improvement for either dental care or lead screening but 
rather on ensuring access to care through the use of a quantifiable access standard that 
applies to all pediatric services. 
The third group of programs (five state programs) had more elaborate plans for 
monitoring the provision of lead screening than dental care, mostly driven by the fact 
that for these programs the federal requirements are more specific on lead screening 
than on dental care. One program has performance measures specific to the well-child 
visit, with an additional performance minimum for lead screening only.  It uses several 
data sources to determine the rate of dental service and referral and EPSDT data to 
determine the rate of lead screenings.  These rates then serve as a baseline for 
improvement on an annual basis and the program gives plans incentives to increase 
performance.  Additionally, the program shares enrollment files with the department of 
health, which created a database on lead screening, and shares plan-specific data with 
plans.  Three programs use minimum performance standards for the well-child visit, 
which are not specific to either dental care or lead screening, but also track the 
provision of lead screening services through data (two of these programs do not track 
dental utilization very closely).  The first of these two programs uses plan-specific Form 
416 data and an integrated data warehouse on lead screening.  It also started collecting 
encounter data and generating plan-specific profiles with the long range goal of 
collecting and monitoring lead screening data on a quarterly basis.  The second 
program requires submission of encounter data and is currently piloting a HEDIS-like 
measure to look at lead screening prevalence by plan. The third program not only uses 
EPSDT statistics but also has access to surveillance data from the department of health 
and performs geographic analyses to work with plans to do outreach.  Finally, one 
program does not have performance measures for either dental care or lead screening.  
It tracks the provision of dental services through dental statistics, and uses the rate of 
lead screenings from the previous year as a baseline for improvement in the following 
year.  It gives plans incentives to improve performance on lead screening and works 
closely with the department of health to set up the incentives.  
 
 
4. Summary of Findings on Monitoring and Enforcement of Standards 
Overall, our findings show that, in the aggregate, states in our sample had 
addressed each key component of a state monitoring plan, i.e., they had developed a 
formal plan with clear goals, assignments, measurements, and milestones, prevention 
strategies, coordination strategies, detection strategies, enforcement strategies, and 
reporting strategies.  There was variation in the degree to which the ten elements that 
have been identified as important to effective implementation were fulfilled.  More 
specifically, we found that: 
• In the aggregate, states had clearly stated their policy goals related to the 
provision of oral health and lead screening services (element one).   
• All states had some contract provisions on the coverage of oral health and 
lead screening services, and standards for measuring compliance with the contract 
provisions (element two).  They varied in how specific those provisions were, 
however.   
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• All states had created a mechanism for monitoring compliance, which 
consisted of data collected at regular intervals and used to measure compliance of 
health plans with quantifiable standards.  States varied greatly, however, in the extent 
to which they had established quantifiable quality performance standards (element 
three).   
• All states had designated an agency responsible for implementing the policy 
goals related to pediatric services, including oral health and lead screening services 
(element four).  However, in several states, the lead agency (Medicaid or SCHIP 
agency) shared roles and responsibilities with other agencies in the area of managed 
care, lead screening surveillance, and dental carve-outs that had the potential for 
adding layers of complexity to its oversight duties and raised issues of coordination 
among the various agencies concerned.   
• The majority of respondents stated that the personnel responsible for 
implementation were committed to promoting the stated policy goals (element five) 
and enjoyed the support of their superiors in doing so (element six), both for oral 
health and lead screening.  Policy beneficiaries, on the other hand, were described 
as demonstrating varying degrees of organization and cohesive support toward the 
implementation of policy goals related to oral health and lead screening (element 
seven).  In three states, managed care organizations showed strong support for both 
oral health and lead screening goals; in two states, they showed support to both but 
questioned the adequacy of resources to achieve those goals; in two states, managed 
care organizations were unanimously opposed to the lead screening goals, and in 
one of these two states, they did not focus on oral health at all; and finally, in one 
state, while the health plan showed support to both goals, network providers did not, 
making it difficult for the plan to achieve the goals.   
• The majority of states had undertaken efforts with the various agencies 
responsible for achieving the policy goals toward administrative coordination 
(element eight), but these efforts varied in their level of formality depending on the 
agency and the state.  For all states, coordination efforts with the Attorney General’s 
office did not entail any close relationship, but rather informal referrals when 
needed.  In terms of coordination efforts with the department of insurance, several 
states described a close working relationship through, for example, regular meetings, 
but several other states only had an episodic relationship or no relationship at all 
with the department. As far as coordination efforts with the department of health, all 
Medicaid agencies had a relationship with the division in charge of lead surveillance, 
albeit in varying levels of formality, and none of the SCHIP agencies had such a 
relationship.  In contrast, in the area of oral health, the majority of agencies, whether 
they were Medicaid or SCHIP agencies, did not have relationship at all with the 
department.  Finally, all three SCHIP agencies described a close relationship with 
their sister Medicaid agency.   
• Many states had designed a graduated system of incentives and penalties, 
which they believed favored compliance (element nine), but most states, even those 
with high levels of managed care penetration, approached enforcement more as a 
collaboration with plans, mostly because of the underlying health system’s issues 
that are beyond the control of either the state or the plan.  
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• The direct involvement of the federal government varied by state (element 
ten), but it seemed to adopt a more active role on behalf of children protected by 
the policies on oral health and lead screening in its oversight of state Medicaid 
programs than in its oversight of state SCHIP programs, particularly in the area of 
lead screening.    
Although our findings do not allow us to rank the ten elements in their order of 
importance in achieving successful implementation of the policy goals related to oral 
health and lead screening, these findings suggest that state monitoring and enforcement 
is strongly influenced by the conditions of the local markets in which the programs 
operate, and, as a consequence, may lose some of its leverage in ensuring that children 
have access to quality care.  At the same time, the findings suggest that states adapt their 
strategies to those conditions in order to achieve the best possible outcomes for 
children under the circumstances.   
 
We also found some noticeable differences in approaches to monitoring and 
enforcing pediatric contractual standards across states depending on the degree of 
managed care penetration and the type of program design in effect in the state.  First, 
managed care penetration was a factor on whether a state had specified quality 
performance indicators and the extent to which it was able to garner support from 
managed care plans and providers for their quality goals, particularly as they related to 
lead screening.  This suggests that, if states opt to use managed care to deliver pediatric 
services, they need a sufficiently strong managed care market upon which to build a 
system of care than can be truly monitored and enforced.  However, our findings also 
suggest that, even in states that have high levels of managed care penetration, 
underlying problems of access to care and provider supply that disproportionately affect 
the population they serve impair states’ ability to ensure plan compliance with their 
expectations regarding the provision of quality pediatric services. 
 
Second, because of the differences in the federal law that regulates the 
monitoring and enforcement obligations of Medicaid and SCHIP agencies, Medicaid and 
SCHIP programs emphasized different areas for quality improvement.  One of the major 
differences noted was the emphasis on oral health exhibited by those states with 
separate SCHIP programs in operation, whether or not the programs used the same 
service delivery system as Medicaid.  In contrast, oral health disease, which is a high 
prevalence condition, was not as given as much emphasis as lead poisoning, a low 
prevalence condition, in Medicaid programs, including SCHIP Medicaid expansion 
programs.  This is most likely because Medicaid agencies are subject to a variety of 
federal obligations, which put a particular stress on lead screening and poisoning issues.  
Oral health care is not as stringently prescribed in Medicaid law. 
Finally, the evidence gathered in the context of this study did not support our 
assumption that states would design more elaborate monitoring and enforcement plans 
for the pediatric standard aimed at a low prevalence condition (here, childhood lead 
poisoning) than for the pediatric standard aimed at a high prevalence condition (here, 
oral disease).  Rather, they either adopted approaches that focused more on the 
monitoring of dental care than lead screening or adopted the same monitoring 
approach for both types of services. 
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D. Conclusions 
 
 
States play a significant role in ensuring health care quality and face a complex 
task because many different parties may be involved in monitoring and enforcement, 
some of whom may not have designed themselves the performance standards by which 
quality is measured.  The Attorney General’s office assumes the lead on fraud and 
abuse, the department of insurance on fiscal solvency and legitimate business practices, 
and Medicaid and SCHIP agencies on service delivery.  The level of interaction between 
these various branches of government varies by state but generally speaking, each sees 
its area of jurisdiction as very delineated and as needing coordination only on a case-
by-case basis.  In their capacity as large purchasers of health care, Medicaid and SCHIP 
agencies are both distributors of information about managed care quality and regulators 
of contractual relationships between managed care organizations and the purchaser, 
and enrollees and providers. This study was intended to look at how Medicaid and 
SCHIP agencies perform both of these tasks.  It examined not only why states included 
certain standards in their contracts but also how they ensured accountability or 
compliance with those standards.  Thus, this study is the story of the “ideal world” states 
formulate in their contractual standards, and the reality states face in implementing these 
expectations in the “real world.”   
 
Our findings on the logic of Medicaid and SCHIP contract performance standard 
selection indicate that states do pay attention to the contract.  Although the level of 
specificity varied across states, contractual provisions generally addressed the service 
components of oral health and lead screening as well as the periodicity with which they 
should be provided.  Differences between Medicaid and SCHIP agencies in the 
specificity of the contractual provisions were typically driven by existing federal 
requirements related to benefits.  These findings suggest that, unless the federal 
government specifies the content of coverage and the periodicity with which it should 
be furnished, states will be more likely to follow professional and industry practice and 
forego attempts to raise the bar in health care quality for children.  They further suggest 
that the federal government will be more likely to specify the content of coverage and 
the periodicity with which it should be furnished in the case of low prevalence 
conditions that are attached to public health concerns.  If those federal specifications 
reflect an advance beyond current norms, as one can expect in the case of low 
prevalence conditions, states may run into serious implementation problems, as our 
interviews seemed to indicate in the case of childhood lead poisoning.   
 
Our findings on the implementation of Medicaid and SCHIP managed care 
monitoring and enforcement indicate that states generally perform some contract 
monitoring.  State approaches were very idiosyncratic, a variation that can be explained 
by the local conditions that define the delivery system.  Legislation is usually broad in 
that regard and probably should remain that way so that states can tailor their 
approaches to what is happening at the local level.  This set of findings also revealed 
that states do not generally consider the contract as all encompassing on quality 
improvement because it cannot appropriately address systemic issues.  These underlying 
delivery system problems mean that contractual language and contract enforcement lose 
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some of their power and that states must turn to other strategies, such as community 
awareness, to deal with these underlying issues. 
 
Taken together, these two sets of findings have important policy implications.  
First, they have important implications for children’s right to coverage under Medicaid 
and SCHIP, which is a crucial issue upon which the current debate on reforming 
Medicaid hinges.  As stated earlier, because the contracts represent the sum total of the 
health care children will receive under either program, the pediatric standards that are 
specified in the contracts, as well as states’ performance monitoring, contract 
enforcement, and access to patient protections become of the utmost importance.  The 
fairly low level of monitoring described in this study and the limited direct access to 
patient protections for both coverage and quality issues described elsewhere brings into 
light the issue of a private right of enforcement by beneficiaries.  Even though Medicaid 
is usually considered to be insurance, it is distinct in certain aspects and functions 
according to principles that do not prevail in the private insurance market.  More 
specifically, the contract between states and managed care organizations may or may 
not constitute a contract of insurance, unless certain elements are fulfilled (e.g., the 
contract makes beneficiaries a party to the contract and requires insurers to obtain a 
license of insurance).  Our research in this area indicates that two of the study states 
have third party beneficiary rights defined in their contract (one granting Medicaid 
beneficiaries third party beneficiary rights, the other explicitly denying those rights) and 
none require insurers to hold a license of insurance.  This could lead courts to question 
the nature of the contract as a contract of insurance and the existence of a private right 
to enforce the contract.  In the absence of such a right, the recognition of a mandatory 
federal individual entitlement as is the case with Medicaid becomes a key component in 
ensuring that children have access to the services they need.      
 
Second, our findings have important implications for children with special health 
care needs.  The higher prevalence of children with special health care needs in 
Medicaid and SCHIP than in the general population warrants particular efforts on the 
part of states to monitor the quality of care received by these children.  While this 
research did not specifically focus on children with special needs, its findings on state 
monitoring of contractual standards targeting childhood lead poisoning suggest that, 
even when the federal government steps in to define with specificity benefits aimed at 
low prevalence childhood conditions and attempts to raise the bar in quality for 
children suffering from these conditions, states encounter problems in their monitoring 
efforts because of resistance at the local level to what is perceived as a waste of 
resources.  This contradiction explains in part the fairly low level of monitoring 
described in this study.  It also points to the need for approaches that are external to the 
contract, if states want to be successful in their monitoring of low prevalence childhood 
conditions.  
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ENFORCEMENT PAPER APPENDICES 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I: 
 
[Individual Medicaid/SCHIP Tables from Contract Analysis] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MEDICAID TABLES 
 
 
 
TABLE A.I: Causes of Disenrollment of Current Enrollees, 
Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 IN MA  NJ SC TX WI 
Failure to comply with 
contract   X X   
Failure to comply with 
Federal laws and regulations     X  
Failure to provide services X     X 
Failure to maintain or provide 
records      X 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
TABLE A.II: Causes for Adjusting Capitation Payment Rates, 
Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 AZ CA MA  MN NJ OH SC TX WI 
Failure to comply with 
contract X X X
2 X  X X   
Failure to comply with 
Federal laws and regulations 
 X        
Failure to comply with state 
laws and regulations      X    
Failure to submit data X1    X     
Failure to comply with 
timeliness and accuracy of 
claims processing 
    X     
Failure to maintain medical 
loss ratio     X     
Failure to use Medicaid 
certified providers         X 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
1. Provision found in the behavioral health contract only. 
2. Provision found in the behavioral health contract only. 
 
TABLE A.III: Causes of Corrective Action Plans, Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 FL IN MA  NJ NY OH SC 
Failure to comply with contract X1  X3   X X 
Failure to comply with state laws 
and regulations 
     X  
Failure to provide quality care    X   X 
Failure to maintain efficient 
delivery system  X      
Failure to provide complete and 
accurate encounter data   X
4     
Failure to comply with EPSDT 
screening rate X
2       
Failure to comply with the 
annual PCP turnover rate   X
5     
Failure to comply with marketing 
guidelines   
  X   
Failure to meet financial stability      X  
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
1. Provision found in the behavioral health contract only. 
2. Provision found in the behavioral health contract only. 
3. Provision found in both the general service agreement and the behavioral health contract 
4. Provision found in the general service agreement only. 
5. Provision found in the general service agreement only. 
 
TABLE A.IV: Causes of Liquidated or Exemplary Damages, Medicaid Contracts 
(2000) 
 
 AZ CA CO FL IN MA  MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
Failure to 
comply with 
contract 
X1 X  X3 X X4 X X   X X   
Failure to 
comply with 
Federal laws 
and regulations 
X1 X  X3       X X   
Failure to 
comply with 
state laws and 
regulations 
X1 X  X3           
Failure to 
provide 
medically 
necessary 
services 
       X       
Failure to 
submit 
corrective 
action plan or 
meet 
requirements of 
corrective 
action plan 
X1  X        X    
Discrimination 
of enrollees on 
the basis of 
health status or 
need 
       X       
Failure to 
comply with 
marketing 
requirements 
    X   X X      
Failure to 
comply with 
enrollment 
requirements 
       X       
Failure to 
comply with 
network 
development 
and access to 
services 
requirements 
    X X4         
Failure to 
comply with 
physician 
incentive plan 
requirements 
       X     X  
Failure to 
submit data, 
medical 
records, or 
other 
information or 
failure to 
submit them in 
required form 
or format by 
X2  X  X X4  X X   X  X 
 AZ CA CO FL IN MA  MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
specified 
deadline 
Failure to 
comply with 
Federal and 
state reporting 
requirements 
regarding 
abortions, 
hysterectomies 
and 
sterilizations 
             X 
Failure to 
comply with 
quality 
improvement 
requirements 
    X          
Failure to 
address cultural 
competency 
    X          
Failure to have 
credentialing 
policies in 
place and 
procedures for 
monitoring and 
sanctioning 
providers or 
failure to 
adhere to 
licensure of 
staff 
requirements 
    X      X    
Failure to make 
payments to 
network 
providers 
       X    X   
Failure to 
comply with 
performance 
standards 
     X4         
Failure to 
cooperate in 
carrying out an 
administrative, 
investigative or 
prosecutorial 
function of the 
Medicaid 
program 
           X   
Failure to 
comply with 
prohibition to 
impose 
copayments or 
premiums 
       X   X    
Failure to 
maintain the 
medical loss 
ratio and any 
losses if funds 
incurred by the 
state due to 
       X       
 AZ CA CO FL IN MA  MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
contractor’s 
noncompliance 
Failure to enter 
into a required 
contract or 
failure to 
contract for all 
services 
required under 
the contract 
           X   
Misrepre-
sentation or 
falsification or 
information 
       X       
Offer of 
employment or 
gratuity to 
influence 
outcome of 
procurement or 
secure contract 
X1              
Employment or 
contracting 
abuses 
       X       
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
1. Provision in general service agreement only 
2. Provision in behavioral health contract only 
3. Provision in general service agreement only 
4. Provision in behavioral health contract only 
 
TABLE A.V: Causes of MCO Payment for Out-of-plan Care, 
Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 FL 
Failure to comply with contract X1 
Failure to comply with laws and 
regulations  X
1 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
1. Provision in general service agreement only 
 
TABLE A.VI: Causes of Receivership, Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 MA NJ SC TX WA 
Failure to comply with contract   X  X 
Failure to comply with Federal laws and regulations    X X 
Egregious behavior   X  X  
Substantial risk to the health of enrollees  X  X  
Failure to cure default within given period of time after 
notification     X 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
TABLE A.VII: Causes of Withholding from Capitation Payments, 
Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 AZ CO FL IN MA MI MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
Failure to comply 
with contract  X X
2 X X4 X X X  X X X   
Failure to comply 
with Federal laws 
and regulations 
X1  X2            
Failure to comply 
with state laws 
and regulations 
  X2       X     
Termination   X   X4      X    
Failure to provide 
medically 
necessary services 
        X    X X 
Failure to comply 
with financial 
soundness 
requirements 
   X X4          
Failure to comply 
with reporting 
requirements 
  X3           X 
Failure to comply 
with cultural 
competency 
requirements 
   X           
Failure to have 
credentialing 
policies and 
procedures for 
monitoring and 
sanctioning 
providers 
   X           
Failure to pay 
network providers              X 
Discrimination 
against any 
qualified 
employee or 
applicant for 
employment or 
other 
discriminatory 
practices (e.g., 
against enrollee 
based on health 
status) 
    X4    X    X  
Imposition of 
premiums or 
charges in excess 
of allowable 
amounts 
        X      
Misrepresentation 
or falsification of 
information 
        X    X  
Failure to comply 
with physician 
incentive plan 
requirements 
        X  X    
Failure to make 
payments to state, 
including 
          X    
 AZ CO FL IN MA MI MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
payment of 
liquidated 
damages related to 
failure to 
complete action 
required by 
corrective action 
plan 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
1. Provision in general service agreement only 
2. Provision in general service agreement only 
3. Provision in behavioral health contract only 
4. Provision in behavioral health contract only 
 
 
TABLE A.VIII: Causes of Recoupment of State Payment to 
Out-of-plan Providers, Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 CO 
Failure to reimburse covered services when contractor 
has received a monthly prepayment to provide these 
services and enrollee has moved outside of 
contractor’s service area 
X 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
TABLE A.IX: Causes of Suspension of New Enrollment, Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 AZ CO FL IN MA  MI MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
Failure to comply 
with contract  X X
2 X   X X  X X X X X 
Failure to comply 
with Federal laws 
and regulations 
           X  X 
Failure to comply 
with state laws 
and regulations 
         X  X  X 
Failure to comply 
with marketing 
guidelines 
X1     X X X X      
Failure to comply 
with enrollment 
requirements 
      X        
Failure to comply 
with financial 
viability 
standards or 
adverse action by 
department of 
insurance 
X1           X   
Failure to comply 
with provider 
network 
requirements 
X1              
Failure to comply 
with 
credentialing 
policies and 
procedures and 
procedures for 
monitoring and 
sanctioning 
providers 
   X        X   
Failure to pay 
network 
providers 
           X  X 
Failure to submit 
data X
1           X   
Failure to comply 
with quality  of 
care and quality 
management 
requirements 
X1  X2            
Failure to comply 
with cultural 
competency 
requirements 
   X           
Failure to pay 
liquidated 
damages within 
specified 
timeframe 
        X      
Failure to 
implement 
corrective action 
plan in timely 
manner 
        X      
Commission of 
egregious first-         X      
 AZ CO FL IN MA  MI MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
time infraction 
Misrepresenta-
tion or fraud            X   
Exclusion of 
Medicaid or 
Medicare 
           X   
Placing health 
and safety of 
enrollees in 
jeopardy 
           X  X 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
1. Provision in the general service agreement only 
2. Provision in the general service agreement only 
 
TABLE A.X: Causes of Termination, Medicaid Contracts (2000) 
 
 AZ CA C
O 
FL IN MA MI MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
Contractor 
violations: 
               
Failure to 
comply with 
contract 
X1  X X3 X X4     X X X  X 
Failure to 
comply with 
Federal laws 
and 
regulations 
   X3  X4      X X X  
Failure to 
comply with 
state laws 
and 
regulations 
   X3  X4     X  X   
Failure to 
meet 
requirements 
for 
participation 
in the 
Medicaid 
program 
 X            X  
Failure to 
provide 
medically 
necessary 
services 
     X4     X  X   
Failure to 
accept state 
capitation 
payment 
     X4          
Failure to 
maintain 
financial 
viability or 
meet 
financial 
soundness 
requirements 
    X X4,5   X X X X X   
Failure to pay 
liquidated 
damages 
within 
specified 
timeframe 
         X      
Failure to 
take 
corrective 
action or 
comply with 
any 
corrective 
action plan  
X1     X4    X      
Discrimina-
tion of 
enrollees on 
the basis of 
health status 
     X4          
 AZ CA C
O 
FL IN MA MI MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
or need 
Failure to 
comply with 
marketing 
requirements 
     X4   X X      
Failure to 
comply with 
network 
development 
and access to 
services 
requirements 
         X X     
Failure to 
provide 
quality 
services 
       X        
Failure to 
comply with 
quality 
improvement 
requirements 
     X4          
Failure to  
monitor 
network 
providers  
            X   
Failure to 
make 
payments to 
network 
providers 
            X  X 
Failure to 
comply with 
performance 
standards or 
benchmarks 
        X    X   
Imposition of 
charges on 
enrollees in 
excess of 
allowable 
amount 
     X4          
Unremedied 
breach 
within a 
specified 
time period 
    X X4   X X    X  
Egregious 
first-time 
infraction 
         X      
Misrepresenta
tion or 
falsification 
or 
information 
     X4       X   
Offer of 
gratuity to 
influence 
outcome of 
procurement 
or secure 
contract 
X1               
Conflict of X1               
 AZ CA C
O 
FL IN MA MI MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
interest 
Adverse 
action  by 
department 
of insurance 
            X   
Exclusion 
from 
participation 
in Medicare, 
Medicaid and 
SCHIP 
          X X X   
Debarment, 
suspension 
or 
prohibition 
from 
participation 
in any public 
procurement 
activity 
X1         X      
Loss of 
qualification 
for licensure, 
certificate of 
authority, or 
certification 
 X      X X X X X    
Discrimina-
tion in 
employment 
or other 
violations in 
employment 
     X5      X    
Appointment 
of a receiver, 
trustee or 
liquidator 
     X4          
Commence-
ment of 
bankruptcy 
proceedings 
     X4   X X  X    
Fraud or 
abuse      X
5       X   
Other reasons 
for 
termination: 
               
Change in 
state needs         X       
Lack of 
appropriated 
amounts for 
the 
continuation 
of the 
program 
X2               
Best interest 
of the state  X   X    X  X     
Protection of 
enrollees 
from injury 
 X    X5   X X  X X   
Protection of 
state  or      X
5   X X      
 AZ CA C
O 
FL IN MA MI MN NJ NY OH SC TX WA WI 
Federal funds 
or property  
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
1. Provision in the general service agreement only 
2. Provision in the behavioral health contract only 
3. Provision in the general service agreement only 
4. Provision in the general service agreement only 
5. Provision in the behavioral health contract only 
 
 
 
 
 
SCHIP TABLES 
TABLE B.I: Causes of Corrective Action Plans, SCHIP Contracts (2000) 
 
 CA CO NY TX 
Failure to comply with access standards specified 
in contract   X  
Knowledge that representations or warranties 
regarding a participating provider may be untrue 
or incorrect 
X    
Hindrance of enrollee access to covered services 
due to inability of providers within plan to accept 
additional enrollees as patients 
 X   
Deficiency or event causing an assessment of a 
liquidated damage    X 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
TABLE B.II: Causes of Liquidated or Exemplary Damages, SCHIP Contracts (2000) 
 
 CA MS TX 
Failure to comply with contract   X 
Failure to establish coverage and related 
administrative services  X  
Failure to  substantially provide medically necessary 
services   X 
Failure to comply with objective performance 
standards monitored by state  X X  
Failure to cure default within specified time period   X 
Discrimination on the basis of health status or need   X 
Misrepresentation or falsification of information   X 
Imposition of premiums or charges in excess of 
allowable amount   X 
Failure to file anti-lobbying certificate  X  
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
 
TABLE B.III: Causes of Suspension of New Enrollment, SCHIP Contracts (2000) 
 
 CA CO TX 
Failure to comply with contract X X X 
Default declared as a result of imminent danger 
to health and safety of enrollees   X 
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
TABLE B.IV: Causes of Termination, SCHIP Contracts (2000) 
 
 CA CO MI MS NY TX 
Contractor violations:       
Failure to comply with contract X X X    
Significant changes in network composition that negatively 
affect enrollee access to services 
    X  
Enrollment procedures resulting in a pattern and practice of 
inappropriate enrollment 
    X  
Deficiencies in quality assurance     X  
Failure to meet licensing requirements    X   
Failure to meet statutory financial requirements or to comply 
with solvency requirements 
   X X X 
Failure to provide access to data, documents, information    X   
Unremedied breach within specified time period    X   
Criminal conviction incident to application for or 
performance of state, public or private contract or 
subcontract or other criminal offenses (e.g., embezzlement, 
theft, forgery) 
  X    
Assignment for the benefit of creditors, appointment of 
receiver, or bankruptcy proceedings 
   X  X 
Brokers’ fees, contingency fees, bribes, gratuities, or kickbacks 
paid to secure agreement 
   X   
Conflict of interest    X   
Discrimination in employment    X   
Other reasons for termination:       
Changes in program, laws, regulations   X    
State no longer needs services   X    
Lack of funding, appropriated funds   X X   
Final administrative or judicial decision or adjudication 
disapproves a previously approved request for purchase of 
personal services 
  X    
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
 
TABLE B.V: Causes of Withholding from Capitation Payments, SCHIP Contracts 
(2000) 
 
 CA CO 
Failure to comply with contract  X 
Failure to make payments to CAHPS vendor X  
 
Source: Rosenbaum et al., Negotiating the New Health System (4th Ed, 2001), 
www.gwhealthpolicy.org 
ENFORCEMENT PAPER APPENDICES 
 
 
 
APPENDIX II: 
 
[Tables from Interview Analysis] 
 
 
 
Table 1.  State Approaches to Performance Measurement of Oral Health Standards 
 
General Approach Specific Approach 
States with clinical 
performance measures 
? State program uses one performance measure specific to dental 
care (i.e., annual dental visit) with three levels of performance: 
(1) performance minimums, or the minimum performance 
expected from health plans (i.e., 45% of members must have 
received an annual dental visit); (2) performance goals, or 
reachable standards (i.e., 55% of members must have received an 
annual dental visit); (3) performance benchmarks, or ultimate 
goals.  Program also expects health plans to show improvement 
from year to year. 
? State program has performance measures specific to dental care, 
with performance minimums and performance goals, but program 
currently looks for annual percentage increase in performance 
compared to previous year. 
? Four state programs have performance measures specific to EPSDT 
well-child visit, with performance minimums, such as Federal 
participation goals.   
o First program uses Federal and state goals of participation as a 
performance minimum; it also uses EPSDT statistics to track 
the provision of dental services.   
o Second program sets performance minimums low with the 
goal to increase them gradually over time.   
o Third program uses Federal goal of  participation as a 
performance minimum; it also uses several data sources to 
determine rate of dental service and referral, which serves as a 
baseline for improvement on an annual basis, and gives plans 
incentives to increase performance.  
o Fourth program uses state goal of participation as a 
performance minimum; while it uses the rate of EPSDT well-
child visits as a starting point to determine whether children 
receive dental care, it plans to use historical data on oral 
screening to set future performance goals. 
? State program sets annual minimum performance levels for the 
HEDIS well-child visit, but they are not specific to any pediatric 
services delivered during the visit except for immunizations.  
Program does not measure access to or quality of dental care 
because it defers to a carve-out managed dental care program to 
perform these monitoring tasks; although dental referrals 
constitute the link between the main managed care program and 
the carved-out program, the program has not yet looked at 
referrals. 
? State program has performance measures specific to dental care, 
with no performance minimums yet.  Program expects to set 
benchmarks at a later date once it knows “what is happening out 
there.”  
States without clinical 
performance measures but 
with monitoring of dental 
services through data 
collection 
? Two state programs have no performance measures, but use 
dental statistics to track the provision of dental services. 
States without clinical 
performance measures and 
monitoring of dental 
services through data 
collection  
? State program does not focus on quality improvement but on 
ensuring access to care.  Program uses a quantifiable access 
standard (i.e., 90 percent of children must have access to a 
pediatrician within 10 miles), though it is not specific dental care. 
 
Source: GW CHSRP, 2003.
Table 2.  State Approaches to Performance Measurement of Lead Screening 
Standards 
 
General approach Specific approach 
States with clinical 
performance measures 
? State program has performance measures specific to lead screening 
services, with performance minimums and performance goals, but 
program currently looks for annual percentage increase in 
performance compared to previous year. 
? Four state programs have performance measures specific to EPSDT 
well-child visit, with performance minimums, such as federal 
participation goals.   
o The first program uses federal participation goal as performance 
minimum and Form 416 EPSDT data as baseline data.  
Otherwise, the department of health is the lead and the program 
is working with the department to improve data analysis and set 
long term goals for targeted screening.  Program awaits future 
guidance from CMS regarding targeted screening before setting 
performance standards specific to lead.  Currently, the program is 
notified by the department of health with the names and the 
birth dates of children with elevated blood lead levels who are 
identified as enrolled in the program.  Following verification of 
eligibility and health plan enrollment, the program contacts the 
plan for follow-up.  Operational and financial reviews focus on 
whether plans follow-up with the necessary services and 
whether plans monitor providers to determine if a screen is done 
according to federal guidelines and the state’s EPSDT periodicity 
schedule.  
o The second program uses federal and state participation goals as 
performance minima and EPSDT statistics to track the provision 
of lead screening services.  Otherwise, program has access to 
surveillance data from the department of health and performs 
geographic analysis to work with plans to do outreach.   
o The third program sets performance minimums low with the goal 
to increase them gradually over time.  Program also tracks the 
provision of lead screening services through Form 416 data, 
including plan specific Form 416 data and, more recently, 
through an integrated data warehouse with state laboratories.  
Finally, the program just started to collect encounter data and 
generating plan-specific profiles, with the long range goal of 
collecting and monitoring lead screening data on a quarterly 
basis.   
o The fourth program uses federal participation goal for both the 
EPSDT visit and lead screening services and EPSDT data to 
determine the rate of lead screening service, which serves as a 
baseline for improvement on annual basis.  Program gives plans 
incentives to increase performance.  Department of health 
created a database on lead screening.  Program shares enrollment 
files with the department of health and shares the data with 
plans, which are separated by plan. 
? State program sets annual minimum performance levels for the HEDIS 
well-child visit, but they are not specific to any pediatric services 
delivered during the visit except for immunizations.  Program 
requires submission of encounter data, which are supposed to 
capture EPSDT encounters and the elements of the EPSDT visit, and 
is now working with plans on improving the data.  They are 
currently piloting a HEDIS-like measure to look at lead screening 
prevalence by plan.  The program plans to require a minimum 
performance level for this HEDIS-like measure when it will make it a 
contractual requirement in 2004. 
States without clinical 
performance measures but 
with monitoring of lead 
? State program has no performance measures, but uses the rate of lead 
screening service from the previous year as a baseline for 
improvement in the following year.  Program gives plans incentives 
General approach Specific approach 
screening services through 
data collection 
to improve performance and works closely with the department of 
health to set up the incentives.  Otherwise, it tracks the billing code 
of laboratories performing blood lead tests from claims data. 
? State program has no performance measures, but uses HEDIS data to 
track the provision of well-child services; interest exists in 
developing measures specific to lead screening but it is currently less 
of a focus than dental care. 
States without clinical 
performance measures and 
monitoring of lead 
screening services through 
data collection 
? State program does not focus on quality improvement but on 
ensuring access to care.  Program uses a quantifiable access standard 
(i.e., 90 percent of children must have access to a pediatrician 
within 10 miles), though it is not specific lead screening. 
States without any 
monitoring 
? State program does not have any performance standards and 
monitoring plan; both are the responsibility of the department of 
health, with which the SCHIP agency has no collaboration as of 
now. 
? State program does not enforce lead component of EPSDT; the 
department of health is responsible for monitoring lead in the state 
because of their population-based approach. 
 
Source: GW CHSRP, 2003.
 
Table 3. State Distribution by Degree of Managed Care Penetration 
 
States with high levels of managed care 
penetration (n=7) 
Seven states fell into this category.  The level of managed 
care penetration ranged from a low 23 percent to a high 
52 percent of the general population enrolled in HMOs.   
Except for one state, all states had a majority of their 
Medicaid enrollees in managed care (range: 54-100 
percent).  Six states had all, or close to all, of their 
Medicaid managed care enrollees enrolled in full-risk 
MCOs, and one state had about 50 percent of its Medicaid 
managed care enrollees enrolled in full-risk MCOs.  All 
states had 100 percent, or close to 100 percent, of their 
SCHIP enrollees enrolled in managed care and in full-risk 
MCOs.   One state had all of its Medicaid and SCHIP 
enrollees in managed care and in full-risk managed care. 
States with medium levels of managed 
care penetration (n=1) 
One state fell into this category, with a 17 percent HMO 
penetration rate.  This state had all of its Medicaid 
enrollees in managed care and in full-risk managed care, 
and about 80 percent of its SCHIP enrollees in managed 
care and in full-risk managed care. 
States with low levels of managed care 
penetration (n=1) 
One state fell into this category, with less than two 
percent of the general population enrolled in managed 
care.  In this state, approximately half of the Medicaid 
enrollees are in managed care but none are in full-risk.  In 
contrast, all SCHIP enrollees are in managed care. 
 
Source: Kaiser Family Foundation, State Health Facts, http://www.kff.org 
 
Table 4.  State Distribution by Type of Program Design 
 
States with 
Medicaid and 
SCHIP Medicaid 
expansion 
programs (n=2) 
Two states fell into this category.  All Federal Medicaid requirements apply, 
including those relating to benefits and program monitoring and 
enforcement.  Federal law requires states to have a quality improvement 
plan in place, which should include quality and access standards, but 
leaves it up to states to determine the details of the plan and standards.  
Federal law also requires coverage and monitoring of EPSDT services. 
Oral screening and referral to a dentist are required as part of EPSDT 
screening services, more specifically the physical examination required 
under the program.  In addition, other necessary care (i.e., diagnosis, 
treatment) discovered by the screen should be covered. At a minimum, this 
should include emergency, preventive and therapeutic services, as defined 
in law, to relieve pain and infections, restore teeth, and maintain dental 
health.  Dental services must be provided at intervals that meet reasonable 
standards of medical and dental practice and should be set after consulting 
with recognized medical and dental organizations involved in children’s 
health care.  CMS, ADA, AAP, and AAFP recommend a direct referral to a 
dentist at 3 years old or earlier if medically necessary and greater frequency 
of dental visits than physical examinations for older children (AAPD 
recommends a dental visit within six months of the eruption of the first 
tooth and no later than the child’s first birthday, and subsequently a 
minimum of two visits per year). 
Lead screening is also part of EPSDT screening services, more specifically 
the laboratory tests required under the program, which include a blood lead 
level assessment appropriate to age and risk.  In addition, other necessary 
care (i.e., diagnosis, treatment) discovered by the screen should be covered.  
The program assumes that all children are at risk and thus should be tested.  
Lead screening must be provided according to a mandatory periodicity 
schedule at 12 months, 24 months and between 32 and 72 months if the 
child has not been previously screened.  If the capillary specimen and the 
venous blood sample confirm an elevated blood lead level, states must 
follow CDC guidelines on patient management and treatment, which 
include a follow-up blood test and investigations on the source of lead. 
Two EPSDT monitoring requirements are imposed on states.  First, they must 
have information available showing that services were provided.  Second, 
they must file annual 416 reports, which break down EPSDT data by age 
group and by categorically and medically needy group.  The report must 
include the number and the percentage of children receiving at least one 
initial or periodic screening service (dental and lead should be specifically 
listed when all screening services were provided) and the number of 
children receiving dental assessments.  States can include more than the 
required elements.  The program has an 80 percent participation goal for 
EPSDT in general and for the number of visits required by age group.  In 
1997, the aggregate Medicaid dental performance across states was 21 
percent of Medicaid-covered children receiving the required EPSDT dental 
services.  Similarly, the aggregate Medicaid lead performance across states 
was low, with 19 percent of Medicaid-covered children ages 1-5 being 
screened for elevated blood lead levels.  In both cases, this performance 
varied widely by state. 
States with 
Medicaid and 
separate SCHIP 
programs, with 
SCHIP contract 
integrated with 
Medicaid contract 
(n=4) 
Four states fell into this category.   All Medicaid requirements apply to the 
Medicaid program (see above) but not the separate SCHIP program, which is 
governed by the SCHIP statute and regulations.  Generally speaking, 
separate SCHIP programs have more flexibility to determine which benefits 
they will cover and what program monitoring and enforcement they will 
pursue.  SCHIP requires states to provide an actuarially-equivalent benefit 
package for basic services, which must include well-baby and well-child 
care.  Unlike Medicaid, dental care and lead screening services are not 
specifically listed as components of well-baby and well-child care.  There 
are no requirements similar to Medicaid in SCHIP regarding monitoring and 
enforcement, i.e. there is no requirement to have a quality improvement 
plan with quality and access standards in place and to monitor and report 
on the provision of well-baby and well-child care services.  When a state 
has integrated its SCHIP contract with its Medicaid contract, it usually 
means that the same agency is responsible for overseeing both programs. 
States with 
Medicaid and 
separate SCHIP 
programs, with 
SCHIP contract 
separate from 
Medicaid contract 
(n=3) 
Three states fell into this category.  All Medicaid requirements apply to the 
Medicaid program (see first column, left) and all SCHIP requirements apply 
to the separate SCHIP program (see second column, left).  When a state has 
issued a SCHIP contract that is separate from its Medicaid contract, it usually 
means that two different agencies are responsible for overseeing each 
program, raising issues of coordination between the two programs.  
 
Source: CMS, 2003, http://www.cms.gov; ADA, 2003, http://ww.ada.org; CDC, 2003, 
http://www.cdc.org 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
“As you know, managed care dominates the provision of health services to low-income, 
publicly-insured children.  Both Medicaid and SCHIP managed care tend to be the 
mirror image of the private market.  Under Medicaid, coverage is unusually broad, 
ranging from comprehensive preventive services to virtually all forms of treatments and 
medical interventions for children with serious health problems, with no cost-sharing 
involved.  Under SCHIP, coverage is somewhat more limited and cost-sharing is allowed 
within certain limits. However, there is a trade-off for the broad coverage and no (or in 
the case of SCHIP, limited) cost-sharing in Medicaid and SCHIP managed care; this 
trade-off is the MCO's extremely tight controls over access to care. For example, 
publicly-sponsored managed care arrangements have no point-of-service option, 
families must use the networks to which they are assigned, and care controls remain far 
stricter, more closely resembling traditional, tightly structured HMO systems.  Because 
the contracts states negotiate on the behalf of children represent the sum total of the 
health care that they will receive, the standards of pediatric care that are built into the 
terms of the agreements themselves, as well as performance monitoring, contract 
enforcement, and access to patient protections becomes of the utmost importance. 
 
In this interview, we would like to understand your expectations regarding the intentions 
that underlie two selected performance standards included in the Medicaid and SCHIP 
managed care contracts.  The first standard relates to a high prevalence childhood 
condition—oral disease; the second standard relates to a low prevalence childhood 
condition—mental retardation/developmental delay resulting from lead poisoning.  In 
this interview, we also would like to understand how these two standards are actually 
monitored.  We are particularly interested in the process of enforcement for both 
Medicaid and SCHIP contracts, which involves not only the Medicaid and SCHIP 
agencies but also other state agencies that may have jurisdiction over certain aspects of 
contract enforcement.  We would like to learn more about how you enforce the 
contracts, and what barriers, if any, you face in doing so.  We would also like to know 
whether the language used in the contract has posed any problems from an 
enforcement standpoint and, if so, what kinds of problems. 
 
There are no right or wrong answers to our questions.  You may choose to answer or 
not answer any or all of them, but we believe that your informed experience will assist 
many others as they develop accountability processes for managed care systems for 
publicly-insured, low-income children  All your answers are confidential.  We will not 
publish any information that could be attributable to you personally.  The final report 
will be sent to you when available.   
 
Any additional comments are also welcome.”   
 
 
 
 
A. FORMAL PLAN WITH CLEAR GOALS, ASSIGNMENTS, MEASUREMENTS, 
MILESTONES 
 
 
1. Does your agency have a formal, written monitoring and enforcement plan for 
the provision of pediatric services spelled out in the Medicaid/SCHIP managed 
care contracts, and if so, what are the main goals of the plan (e.g., to ensure 
access to quality care)? 
 
 
2. What are your agency’s policy objectives regarding the monitoring and 
enforcement of the pediatric oral health standards included in the contract? 
 
2a. Are those objectives stated anywhere else besides the contract (e.g., policy 
guidance, other policy document), and if so, how enforceable are they? 
 
3. Similarly, what are your agency’s policy objectives regarding the monitoring and 
enforcement of the pediatric blood lead level screening and detection and 
MR/DD standards included in the contract? 
 
3a. Are those objectives stated anywhere else besides the contract (e.g., policy 
guidance, other policy document), and if so, how enforceable are they? 
 
 
4. Your Medicaid/SCHIP managed care contract contains a number of pediatric oral 
health standards required of MCOs, why did your agency set the oral health 
standards this way? 
 
4a. Did your agency believe that the standards reflected existing industry 
practices or an advance beyond current standards? 
 
4b. How were the standards arrived at and negotiated with contractors?  
 
 
5. Similarly, why did you set the MR/DD and blood lead level screening and 
detection standards the way you have in your Medicaid/SCHIP contract?  
 
5a. Did your agency believe that the standards reflected existing industry 
practices or an advance beyond current standards? 
 
5b. How were the standards arrived at and negotiated with contractors?  
 
 
6. Which agency(ies) is(are) responsible for implementing and enforcing the 
policies regarding oral health, blood lead level screening and detection and 
MR/DD?  
 
 
7. Would you say that the personnel responsible for implementing and enforcing 
the contract are committed to promoting the policy goals regarding oral health, 
blood lead levels and MR/DD?  
8. Do those implementing and enforcing the policy goals regarding oral health, 
blood lead level screening and detection and MR/DD enjoy the support of 
superiors? 
 
 
9. Would you describe policy beneficiaries—Medicaid/SCHIP recipients and 
MCOs—as organized and as cohesively supporting implementation of the policy 
regarding oral health, blood lead level screening and detection, and MR/DD? 
 
 
 
B. COORDINATION STRATEGIES 
 
 
1. Do the Medicaid/SCHIP agency and the various other agencies responsible for 
enforcement (e.g., AG, DOI) administratively coordinate their efforts? 
 
 
2. Does the Medicaid/SCHIP agency evaluate the results of individual appeals filed 
on behalf of children who have been denied medical care and, if so, how is this 
information used?  
 
 
3. Are the results of internal audits of performance disseminated among companion 
enforcement agencies?  
 
 
4. How do the various agencies involved in enforcement coordinate their data, 
monitoring and investigations to ensure that MCOs that exhibit potentially 
substandard performance in multiple areas are quickly detected and the 
problems addressed?  
 
 
5. Do key staff from the various agencies and programs involved in enforcement 
share information and communicate on a regular basis?  
 
 
6. Does the Medicaid/SCHIP agency track out-of-plan use of services and benefits 
(e.g., furnished by the Title V special needs program) but that also are covered 
under its managed care agreements, and if so, does it require MCOs, which have 
received prepayments to provide these services, to reimburse the state?   
 
 
 
C. DETECTION STRATEGIES 
 
 
1. Has the Medicaid/SCHIP agency created a general mechanism for monitoring 
compliance, and if so, what does it consist of? 
 
 
2. In general, how does the agency identify certain “early warning signs” that act as 
an indicator of potential problems? 
 
 
3. Has your agency specified quantifiable standards for measuring compliance with 
the pediatric oral health standards, and if so, what are they and how are they 
measured? 
 
 
4. Similarly, has your agency specified quantifiable standards for measuring 
compliance with the pediatric blood lead level screening and detection and 
MR/DD standards, and if so, what are they and how are they measured? 
 
 
   
D. ENFORCEMENT STRATEGIES 
 
 
1. Would you characterize your agency and state’s general approach to monitoring 
and enforcement as proactive, systematic, ongoing or as reactive, periodic? 
 
 
2. Are analyses and investigations independently conducted by your agency and 
the state, by an external organization, or by the plans, or a combination of those? 
 
 
3. Would you say that the penalties and incentives you have in place favor 
compliance, and if so, what are they and how have you used them? 
 
 
4. What are some of the barriers your agency faces in enforcing the contracts, e.g., 
has the language used in the contract posed any problems from an enforcement 
standpoint? 
 
 
 
E. REPORTING  STRATEGIES 
 
 
1. Would you say that the Federal government is an active participant on behalf of 
those protected by the existing policies regarding oral health, blood lead levels 
and MR/DD?  Why or why not? 
  
 
2. Does the state report back to CMS and OIG for additional sanctions beyond the 
purview of  the state? How often? 
 
 
 
F. REQUEST FOR REFERRALS 
 
 
1. Would you be willing to refer us to MCOs that would be willing to participate in 
our study and to discuss how they internalize contract requirements? 
 
 
2.  Would you be willing to refer us to colleagues in other agencies (e.g., AG, DOI) 
who would be willing to talk to us about the process they follow to enforce 
Medicaid/SCHIP contracts? 
 
 
 
 
